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Abstract 
 
Since the Treaty of the European Union in 1993, the EU has 
embraced institutional reforms with the stated purpose of achieving 
greater unity in foreign affairs. Despite the EU’s leading role in the 
political and economic reforms of former Soviet satellites in Central 
and Eastern Europe, the EU has been less consistent and cohesive in 
former Soviet space further east—in regions fraught with undemocratic 
qualities and places where the EU enjoys fewer credible incentives and 
less leverage. While scholars point to divergent national interests as 
obstacles for unity abroad, few have unraveled how the institutions of 
the EU itself pose challenges as well. This research asks whether the 
institutions of the EU—particularly the Commission, the Council, and 
the Parliament—promote or hinder the EU’s ability to act as a global 
unitary actor. It analyzes EU institutional democratic discourse in three 
cases of color revolutions in former Soviet space from 2003 to 2011: 
Georgia, Ukraine, and the Kyrgyz Republic. The research is based on a 
qualitative database of official institutional documents from the 
European Commission, the Council of the European Union, and the 
European Parliament to identify patterns of discourse in the 
construction of democracy. The study finds that, across the 
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institutions, democratic discourse is only consistent in the minimal 
requisites of democracy—particularly elections and rule of law—but the 
institutions diverge substantially on whether these elements are 
necessary and sufficient, versus necessary but insufficient. Even if 
member-states find common ground at the national level, the 
institutional dynamics of the EU continue to undermine its ability to 
assert itself as a unitary actor in foreign affairs. The findings of this 
study have implications for theories on international relations, 
democracy, and states. It demonstrates that there are limits to 
mainstream liberal institutionalist approaches best captured by 
constructivism, and that the EU as a whole, the institutions of the EU, 
and the constituent member-states can all become actors with 
competing interests in a given issue area. The study concludes with 
potential avenues of future research.    
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Chapter 1: The European Union on the World Stage 
 
1.1 Introduction 
 
Since the founding Treaty of the European Union came into 
effect in 1993, the European Union (EU) has gradually gained power as 
an actor on the world stage. Its influence is evident in the post-Soviet 
world where it negotiated the admission of ten former communist 
states and possibly several more in the foreseeable future. Despite the 
EU’s leading role in the political and economic reforms of these new 
members, the EU’s ability to act cohesively in the international 
community remains constrained and inconsistent. Yet the EU as a 
whole makes a concerted effort to do so: Each treaty since 1993 takes 
formal and legally binding steps toward a more coherent and 
consolidated foreign policy framework.  
While scholars have pointed to divergent national interests as 
obstacles for unity and cohesion, few have unraveled how the 
institutional complexity of the EU itself poses challenges as well. That 
is, even if member-states find common ground at the national level, 
the institutional dynamics of the EU continue to undermine its power 
as a unitary actor abroad. The primary institutions of the EU fulfill very 
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different mandates and embody supranational, intergovernmental, and 
representative elements. The European Commission acts on behalf of 
EU interests, the Council of the EU acts on behalf of member-state 
interests, and the European Parliament acts on behalf of voter 
interests. These interests do not necessarily overlap and each one 
rests on different sources and degrees of legitimacy. 
This research therefore focuses on the impact of EU 
institutions—particularly the Commission, the Council, and the 
Parliament—on the EU as a unitary actor in foreign affairs. Despite the 
EU’s ability to successfully negotiate the admission of various new 
members undergoing transitions to democracy and free economy, the 
EU is characterized by an internal hodgepodge of competing interests. 
This institutional complexity challenges the notion of the EU as a 
unitary global actor. 
The EU as a unitary actor is perhaps most indispensable in 
foreign affairs, where cohesiveness has been a goal of the EU for many 
years. The EU continues to struggle for coherence in sensitive foreign 
policy areas like security and immigration to little avail, but it has long 
preserved a normative commitment to democracy since its inception, 
even if in rhetoric only. Democratization issues are one of the few 
foreign policy areas where the EU has appeared to be a unitary actor. 
Over the course of five phases of integration that resulted in 27 
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members, the EU has played an important role in numerous 
democratic transitions, namely those of Southern Europe in the 1980s, 
and Central and Eastern Europe following the collapse of communism 
in the region.  Indeed, the most fundamental and non-negotiable 
requirement for admission into the EU is democracy.  
In societies with little to no firsthand experience with democracy, 
much of the defining was led by the EU, but the EU has no official 
definition of democracy; the standards are largely subjective. Likewise, 
there is no consensus on the meaning of democracy among the 
primary institutions of the EU, either. If there is a most-likely context 
in which the EU ought to be a unitary actor in foreign affairs, it is in 
democratization. This research therefore focuses on the sphere of 
democratic discourse in foreign affairs, a sector which appears to have 
some degree of cohesion regarding democratic rhetoric on the surface, 
but which this study contends is undermined by competing institutional 
interests (rather than solely national interests).  
Of the regions across the globe, the EU espouses democratic 
values in the regions formerly under Soviet influence especially. While 
this may have been effective in Central Europe, the Baltics, and to 
some degree even the Balkans, it is less compatible in EU relationships 
further east, in regions fraught with undemocratic qualities and places 
where the EU seems to hold much less leverage, such as Eastern 
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Europe, the Caucasus, and Central Asia. This research seeks to 
uncover how the leading institutions of the EU diverge and converge in 
their framing and formal discourses about non-member-states in 
former Soviet space by analyzing the institutional documents of the 
Commission, the Council, and the Parliament. Institutional documents 
can reveal public discursive patterns used, without the cloak afforded 
by private discourse.  
In the sphere of democracy, these three regions—Eastern 
Europe, the Caucasus, and Central Asia—are united by a common 
historical thread: the ‘color revolutions’, which were popular electoral 
revolutions most associated with Georgia in 2003, Ukraine in 2004 and 
the Kyrgyz Republic in 2005. In these three countries, democratic 
discourse was far more relevant than it had been ever before.  
These regions are notably understudied in EU research as well, 
particularly Central Asia, yet they are places that have grown 
increasingly salient for the EU itself, especially in the post-9/11/2001 
context. The limited research surrounding EU-Central Asian relations 
was understandable considering the limited engagement between the 
two regions throughout the 1990s (Yazdani 2008). After 9/11, 
however, the region’s proximity to Afghanistan added geopolitical 
salience for the West; the US, for instance, established military bases 
in Uzbekistan and the Kyrgyz Republic (Melvin 2008, 3). The EU 
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renewed interest in the region as well, largely due to security, border, 
and energy concerns (Melvin 2008, 4; Yazdani 2008). In addition to 
Afghanistan, the region is geopolitically salient to major Western 
powers such as the EU due to the significance of Central Asia’s other 
neighbors, including Russia, China, and Iran (Yazdani 2008).  
EU ties to the Caucasus have also grown post-9/11, because of 
the region’s periodic political and security volatility. Georgia’s President 
Mikhail Saakashvili has maintained a close relationship with the EU, 
and he and his officials have openly declared EU membership as a 
long-term policy objective. Following the 2004 and 2007 rounds of 
enlargement, countries in Eastern Europe, particularly Ukraine, 
became geopolitically and strategically valuable as buffers between the 
West and Russia. Increased EU interest in former Soviet space was 
evident in the European Neighborhood Policy, a series of bilateral 
agreements established in 2004, and the Eastern Partnership, a 
multilateral framework centered on Eastern Europe, in 2009.  
This research contributes to the fields of EU studies, 
international relations, comparative politics, institutions, foreign policy, 
and democracy. It primarily questions whether the inter-institutional 
dynamics of the EU undermine its ability to be a unitary actor abroad. 
Under consideration is an issue area within foreign affairs that should 
be most conducive to cohesive discourse, i.e. democracy, as well as 
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cases most likely to elicit such discourse, i.e. former Soviet space. 
Therefore, this research explores how the main institutions of the EU 
converge and diverge in foreign affairs as they address issues of 
democracy in non-member-states. The objective is to identify how the 
institutional dynamics of the EU promote or hinder it as a unitary 
global actor. The focus on foreign affairs and policy serves as a crucial 
instance of the level of EU institutional and political integration. It is a 
crucial test case, because it serves as an indicator of how far EU 
integration has advanced. Though the unit of analysis is not foreign 
policy but the institutions themselves, foreign policy is the crucial field 
in which the institutions act or fail to act as a unitary actor. 
 
1.2 A Brief History of the EU, 1951-2003 
 
Today’s EU is the product of over half a century of cooperation in 
Western Europe. The European Union began as the European Coal and 
Steel Community, formally established by the Treaty of Paris of 1951, 
in which war-torn France, Germany, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands, 
and Luxembourg addressed common concerns by establishing a 
supranational institution. The founding members sought the 
reconstruction of postwar economies, the prevention of conflict based 
on nationalism, and the need for security in a Cold War context 
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(McCormick 2005, 52). Coal and steel were the targeted industries due 
to their critical role during war, but also as a way to contain Germany, 
foster interdependence, and encourage industrial development (60).  
Notably absent from the early negotiations of united Europe was 
Britain, which did not join the Community until 1973. Britain’s 
reluctance to join was based in part on concerns about preserving 
influence in the international community vis-à-vis the United States, 
the Commonwealth, and Western Europe (Kaiser 1996, 5-8, 129). 
Until the successes of the then-renamed European Economic 
Community became apparent following the Treaties of Rome (1957) 
and until Britain’s economic power abroad began to decline, there was 
little political and economic incentive for Britain to commit to the early 
European negotiations (116, 126). Britain did apply for membership in 
1961 and 1967 after all, only to be vetoed twice by France’s Charles 
de Gaulle, who perceived close British-US ties as a threat to the 
European (and French) vision of the Community (135). Britain 
renegotiated entry after De Gaulle’s death, and joined the Community 
in 1973.   
The first round of enlargement took place that year, with the 
accession of the United Kingdom, Ireland, and Denmark. The next 
round of enlargement took place in 1981 when Greece joined; Spain 
and Portugal joined five years later. The 1970s and early 1980s were a 
8 
 
period of stagnation for European integration that came to be known 
as ‘Eurosclerosis’. The pace of integration increased in the mid-1980s 
with the Single European Act (SEA) of 1986. The SEA changed 
institutional voting methods, developed social policies, and targeted 
regional inequalities within the EU (Dinan 2004, 209-227). Arguably 
most importantly, the SEA established the single market among the 
twelve member-states and laid the foundation for the Economic and 
Monetary Union (EMU), which would later become the basis for the 
common currency (McCormick 2005, 69). 
A few short years later, communism collapsed in Central and 
Eastern Europe, and it became evident in the 1990s that many former 
Soviet satellites would seek the West for security, growth, and 
stability. The Maastricht Treaty (1993) was a response to this political 
reality, and it introduced a set of criteria for membership, including 
stable institutions that can guarantee democracy, the rule of law, and 
human rights; a functioning market economy; and adherence to the 
EU’s body of law. Amid the changing international environment, 
another enlargement took place in 1995, bringing the membership 
count to 15: Austria, Finland, and Sweden. The EU adopted and 
implemented major treaties in 1999 with the Treaty of Amsterdam, 
and 2003 with the Treaty of Nice. These treaties had ramifications for 
the institutions of the EU, which will be addressed in the next section.  
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1.3 The Institutions of the European Union 
 
The binding treaties of the EU govern institutional powers. 
Notable among them, the Treaty of Maastricht, also known as the 
Treaty of the European Union or TEU (effective November 1993), is the 
foundational framework for the current institutional arrangement of 
the EU. It is also the treaty which gave the EU a formal supranational 
role in foreign affairs for the first time by introducing the concept of a 
common foreign and security policy, with the purpose of achieving a 
unified voice amid a cacophony of member-state policies (TEU 1993). 
Since then, the TEU has been amended on three occasions: Treaty of 
Amsterdam (effective May 1999), Treaty of Nice (effective February 
2003), and Treaty of Lisbon (effective December 2009). Each 
amending treaty conferred greater foreign policy making power to the 
EU, but the basic tenets and authority of the TEU still stand.   
The Treaty of Amsterdam (‘Amsterdam’), which followed the 
crisis in former Yugoslavia, sought to improve coherence and 
effectiveness in foreign policy. In 1999, Amsterdam expanded and 
formalized the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP, discussed 
on the following page) and the position of High Representative of the 
Common Foreign and Security Policy (now defunct) (Amsterdam 
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1999). The Treaty of Nice was signed in 2001, but went into effect in 
2003; it modified EU institutions to accommodate the upcoming 
enlargement. By 2009, the Treaty of Lisbon (‘Lisbon’) added further 
changes by merging the High Representative position from Amsterdam 
with the External Affairs Commissioner to create the post of High 
Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy 
(Lisbon 2009). Lisbon also created the European External Action 
Service (EEAS), which acts as an EU diplomatic mission abroad. 
Based on the founding and amending treaties, the institutions of 
the EU work together in foreign affairs. The European Council—which 
is different from the Council of Ministers and is not an institution I 
analyze in this research—convenes the heads of state to determine 
general foreign policy direction and goals; these are very strategic 
level determinations.  
How the Commission, the Council of Ministers, and the 
Parliament interact in foreign affairs depends on whether or not the 
issue is considered part of the Common Foreign and Security Policy 
(CFSP). The CFSP is limited to sensitive foreign policy areas and “high 
politics”, such as military, defense, and security. Other issue areas 
often associated with foreign policy, such as international agreements, 
humanitarian aid, foreign assistance, and electoral oversight, are not 
part of the CFSP.  
11 
 
  The TEU established and delineated the basic institutional 
process of the CFSP. Under the TEU, the presidency of the Council of 
Ministers, in charge of the CFSP, keeps the European Parliament 
informed, while the Parliament can ask questions, make 
recommendations, and debate CFSP matters (TEU Articles 13, 18, 21). 
The Council “ensure[s] the unity, consistency and effectiveness of 
action by the Union” (Article 13). 
 Foreign policy areas that fall outside the CFSP domain become 
part of the normal policy process of the EU; the Commission is the 
foreign representative in such affairs and proposes legislation to the 
Council, which must conclude and pass the legislation with the assent 
of the Parliament. More specifically, the Council of Ministers (also 
known as the Council or the Council of the EU, but should not be 
confused with European Council and the Council of Europe) convenes 
the foreign ministers of each member-state to define actionable 
specifics of foreign policy. This policy is proposed by the Commission, 
which negotiates international agreements on behalf of the EU. For 
simplicity, we can consider the Commission to be the representative, 
the Council to be the decision-maker, and the Parliament to be the 
consultant. 
 The Commission, foreign representative of the EU: As the 
most supranational institution of the EU, the Commission 
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plays a very important role in foreign affairs: it negotiates 
agreements on behalf of the EU in the international stage. 
Before Lisbon, the Commission’s most important role in 
foreign policy was through the Directorate General for 
External Relations and European Neighborhood Policy 
(known as DG RELEX), which served as the EU 
representative abroad (Popescu 2011, 28). This research 
takes into account configurations before and after Lisbon, 
because the Commission played the same essential role in 
both as the EU representative abroad. 
 The Council, decision-maker of foreign affairs: Foreign policy 
making resides here, in the most intergovernmental of EU 
institutions. Until Lisbon in 2009, foreign affairs topics were 
discussed in the “General Affairs and External Relations 
Council” configuration of the Council, which convened the 
Foreign Affairs ministers of each member-state. After Lisbon, 
this configuration split into two entities: the General Affairs 
Council (addressing issues that cut across policy areas) and 
the Foreign Affairs Council (addressing issues explicitly 
external), both of which convene the foreign ministers of 
member-states. In either case, the national ministers meet 
in these Council configurations to make policy. Several other 
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important roles fall under the Council, including that of the 
Secretariat General of the Council (which is the staff), the EU 
Special Representatives, the Political and Security 
Committee (PSC) of the Council, and the PSC’s sub-
committees (Popescu 2011, 27). This research considers the 
Council in its pre- and post-Lisbon configurations, since they 
all encompassed the same elements: the foreign affairs 
ministries, liaison representatives, support staff, and 
committees.  
 The Parliament, consultant on foreign matters: Although the 
Parliament does not play a leading role in the foreign policy 
process, it does play an institutionalized consultative one, 
especially through its Committee on Foreign Affairs. For 
matters outside the CFSP, the Parliament must consent to 
issues ranging from the accession of new member-states to 
international agreements with non-member-states. For CFSP 
topics, the High Representative (which falls under the 
Council) regularly informs and consults with the Parliament. 
For instance, the High Representative submits a consultative 
document on the main substantive and technical points of 
foreign policy to the Parliament twice per year; the 
Parliament can then pose questions or recommendations to 
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the Council and the High Representative. The Parliamentary 
Committee on Foreign Affairs includes two subcommittees as 
well: security and defense, and human rights. The latter 
assists with a parliamentary yearly report on human rights 
across the world, which the Parliament regularly includes in 
its agenda.  
As the bullets above and Figure 1 demonstrate, the three 
institutions have different sources of legitimacy, types of membership 
representing different constituencies, and divergent interests.
 
Figure 1: Institutions of the EU 
•Supranational, represents interests of the EU 
•EU's international representative; negotiates 
international agreements (except for limited 
CFSP, which resides with the Council) 
•1 Commissioner per member appointed for 5 yrs 
•Only institution that can propose legislation, 
which then goes to the Council and Parliament 
Commission 
(The 
Representative) 
•Intergovernmental, represents state interests 
•Decision-makers; for non-CFSP, makes  EU 
foreign policy based on proposals by the 
Commission and in consultation with Parliament 
•For CFSP matters, retains primary authority 
•Each member-state sends its foreign minister to 
meetings on foreign affairs 
•Appoints the High Representative for Foreign 
Affairs and Security Policy, who chairs the 
Foreign Affairs Council and leads CFSP 
Council of 
Ministers 
(The Decision-
Maker)  
•Subnational, represents interests of the citizens 
•Must consent to legislation, approve Commission 
appointments, and is the only body that can 
dismiss the Commission 
•Ministers popularly elected for 5 yrs 
Parliament 
(The Consultant) 
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While the consultative role of the Parliament in the foreign policy 
process may not seem vital to the EU’s ability to project itself abroad, 
this research contends that the Parliament is essential to this kind of 
research. First, the parliament is one of the major EU institutions, and 
as such requires attention. Second, the parliament is the only 
democratic voice in all EU institutions, and thus it is an important 
perspective to consider. Finally, the Parliament has gradually gained 
power throughout the years, which suggests that (should the trend 
continue) the Parliament will gain power in the foreign policy making 
process. In fact, parliamentarians have already expressed frustration 
at their seemingly relegated role in the process and may pressure for 
greater influence in the future.  
This research focuses on three institutions of the EU: the 
Commission, the Council, and the Parliament. The institutional 
structure of the EU confers uneven powers among them in foreign 
affairs, which may lead scholars in the field to question the value of 
observing their inter-institutional dynamics. This research contends 
that this is precisely where scholars have failed to keep pace. The EU’s 
evolving institutional powers suggest that these three institutions will 
continue to be the primary elements in foreign affairs. Because no 
single institution has or will have sole influence over EU foreign affairs, 
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it is critical to understand how the main players interact, and how they 
affect far-reaching policies. Furthermore, despite the evolution of sub-
institutional entities (such as specific liaisons or committees), the 
major institutions themselves continue to represent a consistent set of 
interests: supranational, national, and subnational. The failure to 
observe inter-institutional dynamics and the assumption that the 
primary obstacle to the EU as a unitary actor abroad stems only from 
national-level divergences are important elements of EU studies that 
merit further attention.     
 
1.4 Purpose of Research 
 
This research project uses a constructivist foundation, which will 
be explained more fully in the next chapter, to explore the sphere of 
EU foreign affairs, a sector which appears to have some degree of 
cohesion regarding democratic rhetoric, but which this research 
contends is undermined by competing institutional interests (rather 
than solely national interests). This dissertation poses the following 
questions: What are the roles, powers, and interests of the EU’s main 
institutions in foreign policy, and how do they portray democracy in 
the former Soviet non-member-states? To what extent do the 
institutions of the EU converge or diverge in approaches to foreign 
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policy, and do the institutions of the EU promote or hinder the EU’s 
ability to assert itself as a global unitary actor? Why does the EU 
emphasize democratic discourse in some cases and not others, and 
what are the patterns of democratic discourse across EU institutions? 
And, finally, why do EU institutions vary in their approaches to foreign 
policy?  
 
1.5 Chapter Overview 
 
 The research is divided into 7 chapters. The next chapter is a 
survey of the relevant literature in international relations theory, 
integration theory, studies on the EU as an international actor, and 
democracy to build a research agenda and theoretical foundation for 
this analysis. Chapter three outlines the research design, including the 
methodology, key concepts, and case and data selection. It will 
demonstrate how qualitative data analysis software facilitates 
qualitative content and primarily discourse analysis to identify relevant 
discursive patterns. Chapter four provides context for the EU internally 
and externally, and for the case studies. Chapter five is the empirical 
chapter, which presents the democratic discourse of the institutions 
based on the data compiled for this study. Chapter six analyzes the 
discursive findings to identify how the EU constructed democracy 
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through discourse in the case studies. The concluding chapter 
addresses the theoretical implications and relevance of the findings, as 
well as potential avenues of future research.   
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Chapter 2: Literature Review and Theoretical Foundations 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
 The European Union has generated a great deal of scholarly 
discussion across a wide range of issue areas. This chapter provides an 
overview of the theories that will be most useful for the questions and 
findings of this research. The first section addresses mainstream 
theories of international relations to identify the potential for and limits 
of interstate cooperation through institutions. These theories include 
variants of realism, liberalism, and constructivism as they relate to 
institutions. The first section also includes academic perspectives on 
the role of the state within the EU and the EU conceptualized as a 
state. The second section explores regionalism and integration theory 
to identify how and why the level of EU institutional integration has 
changed over time. The two main theories in this section are 
neofunctionalism and intergovernmentalism. The third section delves 
into foreign policy and the literature on conditionality, as a form of EU 
foreign policy in former Soviet space, to consider EU use of incentives 
and disincentives along the eastern periphery. The fourth section 
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surveys the democracy literature, while the concluding section outlines 
an agenda for the research presented ahead. 
 The primary element of focus across these theories and sections 
is institutions, which are defined as rules that shape state cooperation 
and competition, behavior and norms, and the organizations that help 
manage the implementation of such rules (Mearsheimer 1994, 8). The 
theories in this chapter will be helpful for understanding theoretical 
debates on whether the notion of the EU as a unitary actor is possible 
or even desirable. They also illustrate the extent to which states retain 
or surrender power to growing institutions. Once the overarching 
institution enjoys powers beyond its constituent member states, such 
as conditionality, academic discourse describes the bounds of 
institutional power in foreign affairs. Taken together, these theories 
will set a solid foundation for exploring inter-institutional dynamics in 
the EU. 
 
2.2 International Relations Theory and Institutions 
 
2.2.1 Neorealism and Institutions 
 The theoretical tenets and assumptions of realists—such as the 
anarchic system, the security dilemma, and the primary role of the 
state as a unitary actor—prove problematic in cases like the EU, which 
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appeared to violate such basic premises. The EU was a seemingly 
successful instance of states pooling sovereignty and overcoming 
interstate competition and conflict through institutions.  
Even after the collapse of the Soviet Union and the bipolar 
system, John Mearsheimer argued that international institutions would 
be unable to shape state behavior in ways conducive to peace. Like 
many other realists, he argued that institutions hold “minimal 
influence” over state behavior (Mearsheimer 1994, 7). Institutions in 
the realist world are simply an intervening variable (13), instead of a 
dependent or independent variable (Keohane and Martin 1995, 46). 
Hedley Bull was the prominent “middle ground” in this 
theoretical debate, and he was closely associated with the “English 
School” of theorists (Linklater 2005, 85). Proponents of the English 
School argue that states can form an international society, but the 
system remains anarchic because they do not need to subordinate 
themselves to the overarching institution (84). Theorists from the 
English School are theoretically distinct from neorealists but retain the 
basic premise of the anarchic system and the pessimism associated 
with realism: Proponents of the English School are more likely to yield 
to claims of inherent conflict and violence between states rather than 
optimistic notions of mitigated conflict and long-term peace facilitated 
by institutions (85).  
22 
 
Thus Bull adopted a less rigid stance regarding how the anarchic 
system bodes for international institutions, arguing instead that states 
can overcome anarchy to form an international society (Bull 1977, 44-
49). States achieve this by determining that it is in their interests to 
adhere to institutional rules and principles, instead of deeming such 
arrangement a “detriment of their interests” (134).  
Although the anarchic system does not preclude the formation of 
common interstate interests, it does present some limitations. 
International arrangements can “function as an instrument of state 
interest and as a vehicle of transnational purposes… as maneuvers on 
the part of particular powers to gain ascendancy” (Bull 1977, 49). Bull 
(1982) also made the prominent argument that the European 
Community’s civilian power abroad relied on the military power of its 
member-states, without which it would be too weak to act 
internationally.  
These views persisted throughout the 1990s. Juan Medrano 
(2001, 156-157) identified the following leading explanations for the 
slow pace of foreign policy integration in the defense and security 
arenas: the existence of the NATO alliance alleviates the need to do 
so; state sovereignty in these topics is more sensitive than in other 
sectors; and member-state interests are simply too divergent to allow 
cooperation or even integration. Medrano, however, presented 
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critiques for each and ultimately argued that the EU’s ineffective 
stance abroad stems from a lack of common vision and interests, as 
well as limited operational capabilities (173-174). For Medrano, “the 
role of the EU in international affairs will in all likelihood remain 
hostage to the differences of interest that exist between its major 
states” (174). Other scholars published works with cynical titles and 
claims, such as Philip Gordon’s “Europe’s Uncommon Foreign Policy” in 
1997, in which he argued that divergent national priorities and the 
difficulty in perceived shared long-term interests fundamentally 
hindered the prospects for foreign policy unity. 
 From the neorealist literature on institutions, I will challenge the 
overemphasis on the role of the state as the central unitary actor, and 
the role of institutions as mere impediments or, at best, as vehicles for 
state security dilemmas. This research will demonstrate that 
institutions themselves can be agents of normative idea formation 
through discourse. 
 
 
2.2.2 Neoliberalism and Institutions 
 The neoliberal perspectives on institutions are more optimistic 
than their neorealist counterparts. One of the most prominent 
neoliberal accounts for institutions is Robert Keohane’s After 
Hegemony (1984), in which he proposes regime theory. Regime theory 
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argues that international regimes—which are arrangements made “as 
responses to the need for policy coordination created by the fact of 
interdependence” (8)—allow governments to realize objectives they 
could not reach on their own (97). Furthermore, international regimes 
promote international cooperation by raising the costs of violating 
agreements, reducing transaction costs and uncertainty, and 
facilitating information sharing (97-107). Regime theorists like 
Keohane view the world as “a complex web of international 
interdependencies between states, which has altered the traditional 
concept of national interests and state sovereignty” (Wunderlich 2007, 
22). 
For Liberals, the state does indeed play a role in shaping 
collective goals, such as those at the EU level: “rather than imposing 
themselves on states, international institutions should respond to the 
demands by states for cooperative ways to fulfill their own purposes” 
(Keohane 1998). Pevehouse and Russett (2006) argue that a 
particular type of institution—a densely democratic international 
governmental organization—reduces the potential for militarized 
interstate disputes. They attribute three causal mechanisms for 
promoting peace: credible commitments, means of dispute settlement, 
and socialization among actors (972-978).   
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 Scholars who espouse optimistic prospects for the future of the 
EU as a cohesive international actor base their arguments on the 
growing potential for interstate cooperation. In his book The Rise of 
European Security Cooperation, Seth Jones (2007) argues that 
cooperation between member-states is indeed evident outside most 
hot-button foreign policy issues and thus far from a failure. Ulrich 
Krotz (2009, 559-563) presents additional reasons for interstate 
cooperation: Europeans tend to favor further cooperation; high-level 
EU politicians promote unity; and there have been recent, albeit 
gradual, successes in policy and reform. In The Quest for a European 
Strategic Culture, Christoph Meyer (2006) argues that national 
divergences do exist, but they have lessened in ways that favor 
normative convergence. 
 I will challenge the neoliberal perspective on institutions to argue 
that institutions not only lower costs and facilitate interstate 
cooperation, but they also compel and compete with constituent states 
to form narratives and ideas of their own. 
 
 
2.2.3 Constructivism and Institutions 
 The constructivist alternative responds to the inherent 
rationalism in many of the mainstream theoretical approaches briefly 
outlined above. In this case, the same objective event—such as war—
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is produced by and generates very different meanings according to 
history, context, and norms; a war in one context may mean 
something completely different in another, and its advent may be due 
to or stem from a number of ideational factors. Thus agents, their 
decisions, and the social structures they generate (including 
institutions) must be put into context. 
 Alexander Wendt is one of the leading proponents of 
constructivism to challenge the rationalist tenets of realism and 
liberalism (1999, 2-3). His seminal work, Social Theory of 
International Politics (1999), argues that ideas matter much more than 
materialist theories are willing to concede. The social system is a 
single structure made up of material and ideational components (190). 
Wendt is emphatic in that he does not assign greater value to ideas 
over materialism and power (135). Instead, he emphasizes that ideas 
are not necessarily causal, but “they constitute the ‘material base’ [of 
power and interest] in the first place” (135).  
 Wendt’s constructivism, however, included a “structural bias” 
that led to further refinement of the theoretical perspective by other 
scholars in the field (Widmaier and Park 2012, 126). This structural 
bias, which made identifying potential agents of change difficult, was 
his emphasis on “the role of ‘exogenous shocks’ in the evolution [and 
change] of system orders” (126). Critics of the structural bias argued 
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that agents themselves could shape their intersubjective structures 
through the use of rhetoric and persuasion (126). Martha Finnemore 
and Kathryn Sikkink (1998, 895-896) unpacked the concept of norms 
to argue that norms develop along a three-part “life cycle”: 
emergence, cascade, and internationalization. In the emergence stage, 
“norm entrepreneurs” draw attention to the norm based on a 
particular organizational platform, such as an NGO (896-900). In the 
cascade stage, a tipping point from the first stage allows for the norms 
to diffuse and become socialized internationally, whether via 
diplomatic or materialist means (902). Finally, the internationalization 
phase occurs when the norm is so widely accepted internationally that 
such norms appear isomorphic across societies (904-905). Thus 
scholars like Finnemore and Sikkink emphasized the strategic power of 
agents in promoting change (Widmaier and Park 2012, 124). 
 Other strands of constructivism looked to sources of change 
other than strategic agents. These scholars argued that emotional, 
affective, and sentimentalist influences could shape change and 
interstate commitments (Widmaier and Park 2012, 129). Andrew Ross 
(2006) uses the example of 9/11 to illustrate the power of affect and 
emotion, particularly when they are not coherent and obvious. He 
argues that micropolitical processes of emotion can shape social 
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practices beyond “strictly instrumental products of affective 
mobilization” (like revenge) (215). 
In a study of the EU, Frierke and Wiener (1999, 725) adopt a 
constructivist approach to argue the following: “[W]e are not looking 
for a unidirectional relationship between preferences and outcomes, 
but rather at a changing context within which identities and interests 
are mutually constituted through a process of interaction. If the 
meaning of a speech act is dependent on a context, it follows logically 
that, if the context changes, so will the meaning of an act.” In this 
regard Frierke and Wiener remain sensitive to context and diverge 
from the rationalist school of thought. Domestically in target countries, 
elite commitment to reform, such as pro-reform national governments, 
and the establishment of new political institutions conducive to 
democratic consolidations, such as higher electoral thresholds, matter 
as well (Bandelj and Radu 2006).  
 The constructivist perspective on institutions outlined here will 
serve as the foundation of this research, in which institutions are the 
source of identity formation and norms. The Commission, the Council, 
and the Parliament engender different narratives and ideas, which can 
subsequently become impetuses for action or inaction.  
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2.2.4 States and the EU as a State 
 The state is the primary unit in many of the mainstream theories 
outlined above, but its role continues to be contested in EU studies. 
The debate surrounds whether or not the EU can be conceptualized as 
a state, and what the role of the traditional state is within the EU. 
Scholars who study the EU sometimes have the tendency to attribute 
Westphalian elements of the state to the EU, especially when they 
discuss certain foreign policy issues like immigration, security, and 
borders. Jan Zielonka (2006) argues that the EU is more like a neo-
medieval empire than a traditional state; scholars therefore travel 
down a misleading road of flawed statist expectations (141). Regional 
international organizations, specifically the EU, become a tool for 
member-states to pursue national interests, undermining the notion of 
the EU as a unitary state (140-163). Zielonka’s argument is similar to 
the realist pessimism regarding the relationship between states and 
regional institutions: states capitalize on the institution as a vehicle for 
their own national interests rather than as a means of cooperation for 
the sake of shared interests.  
 For Zielonka, while the EU is indeed a viable actor in the 
international community, it is qualitatively different from traditional 
states in terms of governance (states traditionally have hierarchical 
governance), means (states traditionally have military means at their 
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disposal), and objectives (traditionally linked to concerns about foreign 
aggression), among others (140-163). “Finding the right balance 
between principles and prudence in foreign and security policy will be 
the key to Europe’s future in the field,” he argues (163).  
 Modern conceptualizations of the state—and whether the EU we 
know today is a “state in the making” (Zielonka 2006)—are rooted in 
the traditional Westphalian state. Indeed, as Hedley Bull argued in 
1982, traditional powers of the state—particularly military power—
enable the EU to act internationally as a civilian power. Prior to the 
modern state, authorities and identities overlapped and encompassed 
multiple horizontal and vertical orders. The monarchies that preceded 
the modern state were sometimes unable to exert power over local 
rivals, and would instead rely on indirect rule (Tilly 1985, 174). In his 
analogy of the state as a product of war and organized crime, Tilly 
(1985, 169, 181-182) argues that the state is the result of four 
interdependent dimensions: war making, state making, client 
protection, and extraction as a means for the first three. Therefore, 
the state has only come to assume monopoly of security and means to 
extract (namely taxation), or grantor of such to another entity, over 
time.  
Other scholars built on Tilly’s argument. Daniel Beland (2005) 
adds the responsibilities of state regulation and redistribution to Tilly’s 
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dimensions. Venelin Ganev (2005), on the other hand, reverses Tilly’s 
ideas on state-making to explain the decline of infrastructure in post-
communist states immediately after the collapse of communism. He 
argues that, just as predatory elites can build a state in Tilly’s original 
account, they can also destroy the infrastructure of a state against the 
will of its people (Ganev 2005). This predatory behavior is unique in 
that it targets “the public domain” (the object of the state’s traditional 
monopoly over extraction) rather than the resources of a specific social 
group (439).  
 Other scholars admonish not to ‘wish away’ the role of the state 
and national interests. As Saskia Sassen (2003, 11-12) argues, the 
state remains relevant in the negotiations of supranational entities and 
some states even gain power. It is flawed to think of member-state 
and EU relations as a zero-sum game of dualities (Sassen 2003). In a 
more recent study, Sassen (2008) argued that basic values of the 
Westphalian state—such as rule of law—have enabled the very 
international institutions that we associate with globalization and 
denationalization.  
States can also serve to filter global processes at the 
supranational level by offering citizens a means to hold supranational 
entities accountable for policy (Sassen 2003, 28). Individuals are no 
longer confined to the recourses afforded to them by the state, and 
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they can circumvent traditional state channels (Jacobson and Ruffer 
2003; Moens and Trone, 2010). Nevertheless, as Gary Marks and 
Liesbet Hooghe (1996, 4, 89) argue, political authority and influence in 
the EU is shared and interconnected, not nested, and states no longer 
serve as the “sole interface” between the supranational and the 
subnational levels.   
 In this research, I respond to the debate over whether the EU 
can be conceptualized as a state, and what the role of the traditional 
state is within the EU. It may be misleading to apply characteristics of 
the state to the EU, which does not necessarily need to embody the 
features of a traditional Westphalian state. Instead, the EU may be a 
new arrangement in the making, one with a common policy in some 
sectors and multiple policies in others. Furthermore, the traditional 
(member-)state within the EU is neither the sole unitary actor nor the 
primary actor. Rather, the state pursues competing interests alongside 
the institutions of the EU. This research will demonstrate how these 
elements of the state develop in the EU. 
 
2.3 Regionalism, Integration Theory, and Institutions 
 
 This research is also informed by regionalism and integration 
theories as they relate to institutions. These theories help explain how 
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and why institutions develop or fail to develop in the first place. The 
epitome of regionalism is the EU, the only one of its kind, embodying 
both supranational and intergovernmental institutions, and intertwined 
more closely than any other region of the world. Although no other 
regionalist project compares to the EU’s level of integration and 
supranationalism, the EU serves as a model for a number of other 
organizations, therefore attracting significant theoretical attention 
(Duina, 2006, 268-269; Grugel, 2004, 613).  
Because regionalist arrangements are institutions, theoretical 
perspectives in international relations differ regarding regionalism as 
they do institutions. For neorealists, regionalism is akin to the 
formation of alliances, and states remain self-interested as they seek 
to maximize gain and balance external economic pressures (Tassinari 
2004, 20-22). It can also be a way to improve relative security for the 
sake of survival in the anarchical system (Wunderlich 2007, 19). 
Security, in this case, is relative to new threats, whatever form they 
may take. For the EU enlargement eastward, the new “threat” may 
have been economic competitiveness or the hegemonic ambitions of 
large neighboring states like Russia (20). Neoliberals, on the other 
hand, argue that regionalism is a way to “help reduce anarchy by 
constraining state behavior”, but they go much further than 
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neorealists to say that regionalist institutions can facilitate long-term 
integration and cooperation (21).  
As with institutions, constructivists diverge from the state-centric 
explanations of their theoretical rivals to argue that discourse, 
perceptions, identity, and subnational issues—not necessarily 
interstate conflict—can explain the reasons for regionalism (38). Using 
the constructivist lens, one potential explanation for regionalism in the 
EU would be a shared sense of regional identity and “Europeanness” 
(Tassinari 2007, 29). The ‘big bang’ enlargement of 2004 serves as an 
example of how shared identity is a compelling explanation for 
integration. Although uncertainty characterized the initial years of 
democracy in Central and Eastern Europe, the transitional 
governments of these countries attempted to distance themselves 
from their communist pasts through accession to Western 
organizations (Jacoby 2004, 6).  Perhaps of greatest political and 
economic importance was membership to the EU, which was a source 
of “European” (rather than “East European”) identity.   
Regionalism is referred to as either “old” or “new” in both the 
temporal and substantive sense. Old regionalism, which tended to 
focus on economic regional integration, figured most prominently in 
the 1950s and 1960s (Duina 2006, 248). Old regionalism prioritized 
“protectionism, [and] sealed internal markets or security communities” 
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(Grugel, 2004, 605). Geopolitics was a secondary though important 
concern, with security and stability as political priorities in the bipolar 
system (Hveem, 2000, 70).  
New regionalism, on the other hand, looks to political legitimacy 
and identity in the context of globalization (including economically), 
and moves beyond traditional notions of the Westphalian state 
(Hveem, 2000, 71). Emerging towards the end of the Cold War, the 
phenomenon began with the European Community’s move toward the 
single market (73). New regionalism opts for “openness to global 
capitalism” (Grugel, 2004, 605). It reflects a “collective action 
problem,” whereby national governments are not able to effectively 
pursue their goals independently (Hveem, 2000, 71).  
The most relevant debate within regionalism (Wunderlich 2007, 
1) for this research, is integration theory. Two integration theory 
camps seek to explain how and why the institutions of the EU have 
grown through the years: neofunctionalism and intergovernmentalism. 
Neofunctionalism was led by Ernst Haas (1961, 368, 372), who argued 
that early decisions would “spillover” to other more controversial 
functions in ways that promoted integration: “[P]olicies made pursuant 
to an initial task and grant of power can be made real only if the task 
itself is expanded.” Neofunctionalism holds that elites seek to resolve 
issues at the supranational level, and a dynamic process then 
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develops, in which supranational institutions respond to increased 
social expectations, thereby gaining more authority and legitimacy 
(Sweet and Sandholtz 2003, 221). ‘Spillover’ occurs in the pursuit of 
policy goals, which stimulates further supranational integration (221).  
Alec Stone Sweet and Wayne Sandholtz (1997, 307; 2003) 
refined the theory further in response to the period in the 1970s of 
stagnant integration. They conceded that certain junctures of 
integration are marked by intergovernmental interest or resistance, 
but the primary driving force remains neofunctionalist (1997, 306; 
2003, 228, 237): “[States] can attempt to slow integration or push it 
in directions favorable to their perceived interests, but they do not 
drive the process or fully control it. In a fundamental sense, 
governments are reactive, constantly adjusting to the integration that 
is going on all around them.” Thomas Risse (2005, 305) added a 
constructivist interpretation, and made the claim that “socialization 
into European identity works…on the national levels in a process 
whereby Europeanness…is gradually being embedded in 
understandings of national identities.” For Risse, this means that 
member-states may be receptive to EU identity in varying degrees.    
Critical of the view that states lose power in the integration 
process, an opposing and influential camp developed in integration 
theory. Andrew Moravcsik (1993, 474), a leading liberal 
37 
 
intergovernmentalist, does not believe EU integration requires its own 
unique theory (as neofunctionalists do), and rather draws from 
existing international relations theories of liberalism. Moravcsik argues 
that EU member-states act rationally according to domestic pressures 
and international strategy, and that integration does not restrict the 
domestic goals of member-states (474). Intergovernmentalism holds 
that leaders pursue and respond to national economic interests 
through policy coordination and cooperation (Moravcsik 2003, 242).  
For Moravcsik, member self-interest and state bargaining explain 
integration.  
 This study contributes to the theoretical discussion on 
regionalism and integration. As constructivists have posited, interstate 
conflict is not the sole reason for regionalism and integration. Instead, 
a shared sense of identity—particularly of Western democracies—is 
also a source of regional organization. Many of the post-communist 
new member states sought closer ties to the West, particularly the EU, 
as a way to identify with Western democracy, or as a way to counter 
the Russian “other”.  
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2.4 Foreign Policy, Conditionality, and Institutions 
 
The academic literature regarding foreign policy and 
conditionality is important for this research, too. Perspectives on 
institutional foreign policy, and conditionality as an instance thereof, 
do not always adhere to mainstream international relations theories, 
other than they tend to move away from the heavy neorealist 
emphasis of the state (Hyde-Price 2004, 99-100). Foreign policy 
analysis traditionally employs micro, individual, and actor-centered 
approaches (Hudson and Vore 1995). Scholars like James Rosenau led 
the push for comparative foreign policy studies across nations by 
isolating key characteristics and variables, but comparative 
approaches in foreign policy analysis remain relatively uncommon.  
Graham Allison’s view of bureaucratic politics as a model for the 
role of institutions in foreign affairs argues that issues outside foreign 
policy affect decision-making in foreign policy (Allison and Halperin 
1972; Hyde-Price 2004, 105). In this case, institutions base their 
decisions in foreign policy on their own organizational interests, such 
as resources and influence (Hyde-Price 2004, 105). Furthermore, a 
given institution can have many actors within it and may not 
necessarily be unitary (Allison and Halperin 1972, 43). In turn, these 
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players must aggregate their interests to produce policy at the 
institutional level (50).  
One way institutions can exercise foreign policy is through 
conditionality, or leverage: “International institutions use 
conditionality… to direct policy in target states” (Epstein and 
Sedelmeier 2008, 795). Following the collapse of communism, EU 
decision-makers in the Commission and the Council began to devise 
standards for democracy along their periphery. Armed with the 
incentive of full membership, the EU exercised leverage to induce 
domestic changes in institutions, polities, and laws. During 
negotiations, requirements for accession were articulated by the 
Copenhagen Criteria of 1993, whereby the EU Commission set forth 
three sets of standards: stable institutions that guarantee democracy, 
the rule of law, and human rights; a functioning market economy; and 
adherence to the EU’s body of law, known as the acquis communitaire. 
The EU then monitored each applicant for compliance. 
As stated earlier, explanations of conditionality do not fit into 
distinct theories of international relations. In fact, many of the scholars 
who focus on conditionality are comparativists, not international 
relations theorists. Nevertheless, traces of international relations and 
the role of the state are evident in the literature on conditionality, 
especially in how conditionality works: through the power of 
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asymmetries (neorealism), the power of uncertainty (neoliberalism), 
or the power of norms (constructivism).   
In the realist vein, conditionality is based on power asymmetries, 
whereby a stronger power imposes reforms on the weaker power 
(Agne 2009, 2). An example is when applicant countries adopt a law 
because it is mandated and coerced by the EU to do so for accession, 
not because the applicant wants to adopt the reform (2). In the liberal 
vein, conditionality is based on the uncertainty of domestic actors in 
the target states, their perceived status relative to the international 
institution, and the credibility of policy (Epstein 2008, 9). Realist and 
liberal views cite the carrot-and-stick measures of policy reform and 
financial stipulations. The ‘carrots’ were membership and aid 
incentives, while the ‘sticks’ were the threats of losing either or both, 
as well as possible sanctions or other repercussions. These 
conceptualizations of conditionality were thus materialist, rationalist, 
and incentive-based. Constructivists, on the other hand, questioned 
the underlying normative power of the EU instead (Epstein and 
Sedelmeier 2008, 802; Johnson 2008).    
 Most scholars who focus on conditionality do so in terms of 
power asymmetries and incentives. Milada Vachudova (2005, 63) 
refers to conditionality as either passive leverage (“the attraction of EU 
membership”) or active leverage (“deliberate conditionality”). In 
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addition, conditionality can be positive or negative, based on 
pragmatism or ideology, and consistent or inconsistent in application 
(Grabbe 2002, 250). Geoffrey Pridham (2001, 69) adds that the EU 
has symbolic influence as a club of Western liberal democracies, yet 
applies direct pressure through policy commitments and financial aid. 
Schimmelfennig et al. (2003, 497) argue that EU conditionality is 
effective by positive reinforcements, i.e. rewards through material 
bargaining. To induce compliance, the EU provides aid, market and 
institutional access, and technical guidance. This is the causal 
mechanism that Schimmelfennig et al. identify for hard leverage, but 
they argue that it works under “the condition of low domestic political 
costs” (514). It stands in contrast to soft leverage through the 
mechanism of legitimacy and recognition, which they argue is 
important, yet, not explanatory (515).  
 Scholars preserved a similar emphasis to power asymmetries 
and incentives for the time period after the accession of new member 
states, many of whom were still reforming their political, economic, 
and social system. Even after a target state gains membership and the 
EU as a whole loses its ultimate leverage incentive of membership, the 
EU can compensate its influence through alternative mechanisms, such 
as aid, trade, and socialization (Levitz and Pop-Eleches 2010). Ulrich 
Sedelmeier (2008) suggests two additional reasons for continued 
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compliance that go beyond the classic threat of sanctions and punitive 
policies. First, the new members were able to increase legislative 
capacity during the pre-accession period, which may account for post-
accession effectiveness (820). Second, the new members may have 
been socialized during the pre-accession period, which makes EU 
‘shaming strategies’ effective. He argues that three possible 
explanations exist for post-accession compliance with the EU in Central 
Eastern Europe: the threat of sanctions, rationalist institutionalist 
focus on formal legislative capacity-building, and socialization 
stemming from the experience of conditionality, including ‘shaming 
strategies’. Tim Haughton (2007) posits that the EU is more effective 
at certain points in time; the EU’s influence, in other words, is uneven 
across time. Finally, Mungiu-Pippidi (2007) assesses the issue of 
‘backsliding’ in the CEE region and concludes that the issue is actually 
one in which heightened expectations are now aligning with reality.  
 The EU as a normative unitary actor has gained traction in the 
literature as well. An example of how normative power is used to 
explain foreign policy in the EU is with the European Neighborhood 
Policy (ENP), an EU framework comprising bilateral relationships 
spanning from Algeria to Ukraine to Georgia. The ENP has been 
described as promoting normative influence, especially in post-Soviet 
states with potential, though not immediate, aspirations to join the EU 
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(Michalski 2007, 126). Nygren (2008, 126-127) argues that EU 
democracy promotion efforts in the ENP were more effective in target 
countries of EU hopefuls and less effective in countries with little 
realistic prospect of membership: “This suggests not only that using 
the stick is not enough, but that a carrot may be more effective. It 
also confirms the view that whatever power the EU has, it is more of a 
magnet than a gun. […] the less likely an eventual EU membership, 
the more remote is the success of democracy norm dispersion.” 
 The power of ideas inherent in constructivism is evident in John 
Meyer’s (2001) perspective on the interactions between the EU and 
states. He argues that the EU serves as a democratizing force in other 
nation-states through ‘otherhood’. Otherhood is “the constant 
elaboration of expectation for actors” through rules and regulations 
that delineate the responsibilities of said nation-states (348, 350). This 
constant elaboration is an example of constructivist emphasis on the 
affective influences that shape interstate change and the construction 
of norms (Widmaier and Park 2012, 129). Otherhood is a powerful 
network because of the institutionalized ‘culture of rationalization’ it 
entails (Meyer 2001, 350). A culture of rationalization is akin to natural 
law, promoting human rights and social development, among others 
(350-352). Decoupling—or the (significant) gaps between policy and 
practice—often results (346-347). 
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 The role of the EU as norm exporter is not without criticism. Jan 
Zielonka (2008) adopts a critical stance of the EU as a global actor in 
the democratization process. He is critical of the EU resorting to 
assertive and imperialist means (e.g. economic leverage) to impose 
European norms and values regionally and globally. Zielonka views the 
EU as an empire that uses valuable power asymmetries to impose 
political and economic conditions on weaker countries. Even globally, 
the EU uses trade and trade regulation as leverage for its preferences. 
He is also skeptical of global relations that appear to benefit the 
recipient, because “they are at root designed to promote EU interests” 
(480). In a normative sense, Zielonka believes the EU’s imperialist 
approach should be replaced with a benign one that upholds the EU as 
model and example. 
 I respond to the foreign policy and conditionality literature by 
offering a crucial test case for both. Institutional cohesiveness in 
foreign policy is a test for the level of integration in the EU. 
Furthermore, states less receptive to the traditional conditionality 
tactics of the EU, relative to the new member states of Central Europe, 
suggest that the EU enjoys less influence in states where the prospects 
of membership are low (Michalski 2007; Nygren 2008). 
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2.5 Democracy and Democratization 
 
 Lastly, because this research observes the discursive 
construction of democracy, theories on democracy and 
democratization inform this study. Most of the academic discourse on 
democracy stems from the comparativist literature and the rise of 
liberal Western democracies in the post-War context. Among the most 
influential traditional definitions of democracy are the minimalist and 
procedural ones. Joseph Schumpeter (1942, 269) proposed one such 
definition that described democracy as an “institutional arrangement 
for arriving at political decisions in which individuals acquire the power 
to decide by means of a competitive struggle for the people’s vote.” In 
Schumpeter’s democracy, minimal procedures and structures are in 
place for elite competition, and voters choose among the competing 
elites.  
Other scholars built on Schumpeter’s minimalist definition, 
namely Robert Dahl (1971), who adopted a procedural understanding 
of democracy. He used the term ‘polyarchy’ to describe advanced 
Western liberal political systems as incomplete democracies, 
characterized by various dimensions of rights and freedoms designed 
to allow citizens to develop and demonstrate their preferences, and to 
protect them from discrimination against those preferences (2-3). 
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Minimalist definitions inspired by Schumpeter and Dahl persist today. 
Adam Przeworski (1999, 23), who views democracy as simply a 
system in which rulers are elected, argues that additional criteria 
beyond this minimalist definition are important for the quality of 
democracy and its prospects for survival but not for the definition itself 
(50). 
Many scholars, however, sought to move beyond minimalist 
conceptions of democracy toward structural arguments that focused on 
social and economic dimensions. This trend was evident among 
modernization theorists, like Seymour Lipset (1959, 82-82), who 
argued that economic development facilitates democracy through 
factors such as urbanization, literacy, media, and industrialization, 
which produce a diamond-shaped rather than pyramid-shaped social 
structure conducive to democracy. Samuel Huntington (1968) was 
influential in his caution that modernization would lead to instability 
without the proper institutions to absorb the social shock of 
modernization, and that political order would have to precede 
democracy instead. For Huntington, institutions were crucial to channel 
the shifts in values and expectations generated by modernization (32). 
In response to modernization theory, Adam Przeworski and Fernando 
Limongi (1997, 177) argued that, while economic development does 
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not cause democracy per se, greater economic development improves 
the likelihood of democracy’s survival once it is established.   
With the collapse of Portuguese and Spanish authoritarianism in 
the mid-1970s, a new era emerged which came to be known as the 
‘third wave of democratization’ (Huntington 1991). The literature on 
democracy shifted to a greater focus on studies of the transition away 
from non-democracy (and many assumed toward democracy), 
oftentimes posing arguments that favored agency over structure. 
Perhaps the clearest distinction between transitions and 
democratization is provided by Guillermo O’Donnell and Phillippe 
Schmitter (1986, 6): A transition is the period between the fall of one 
regime and the rise of another in its place. The term democratization 
is more complex (8): “the processes whereby the rules and procedures 
of citizenship are either applied to political institutions previously 
governed by other principles… or expanded to include persons not 
previous enjoying such rights and obligations… or extended to cover 
issues and institutions not previously subject to citizenship 
participation.” O’Donnell and Schmitter also stress that 
democratization and liberalization—that is, “the process of making 
effective certain rights that protect both individuals and social groups 
from arbitrary or illegal acts committed by the state or third parties”—
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are not synonymous, since nondemocratic regimes can liberalize 
without democratizing (7-9). 
One of the most important contributions to transitology was 
Dankwart Rustow’s (1970) account of the transitions process. Rustow 
was critical of his contemporaries on democratization, whom he viewed 
as exploring the factors conducive to democracy rather than asking 
“the genetic questions of how democracy comes into being in the first 
place” (338-340). Thus he proposed a four-part model to transitions: 
national unity as a necessary precondition, a preparatory phase of 
political struggle, a decision phase of leadership deliberation over 
crucial features of democracy, and a Darwinian-like habituation phase 
in which democracy becomes increasingly ‘palatable’. Rustow’s 
redirection away from the social and economic structural arguments of 
his contemporaries served as a model for a generation of scholarship 
that valued agency and elites.  
Scott Mainwaring, Guillermo O’Donnell, and J. Samuel 
Valenzuela (1992) unpacked the concept of “transitions” further. They 
argued that two transitions actually occur: one from liberalization of an 
authoritarian regime to the installation of a democratically elected 
government, and the second from democratically elected government 
to democratic consolidation (1-3). Democratic consolidation refers to 
the institutionalization of democratic rules, a definition that is 
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presented in more complex terms by other scholars (Mainwaring et al. 
1992, 69; Schedler 1998). Democratic consolidation is also described 
simply as when political actors accept democracy as “the only game in 
town” (a phrase first attributed to Giuseppe di Palma but later used 
widely in the literature). Samuel Huntington also sought to contribute 
to the idea of democratic consolidation. In The Third Wave (1991), a 
book that identifies historical patterns and waves of democratization, 
he used a minimalist-procedural definition of democracy to identify a 
test for democratic consolidation: the two turnover test of democracy, 
in which a “peaceful transfer of power” occurs through elections twice 
(266-67). 
Overall, one of the more comprehensive and influential books on 
transitions, democratization, and consolidation is Problems of 
Democratic Transition and Consolidation by Juan Linz and Alfred 
Stepan (1996). Their research identifies various factors central to 
transitions, including macro-level (stateness, prior regime type), actor-
centered (leadership base of the prior regime, who initiates and 
controls a transition), and contextual (political economy, constitution-
making environments, and international influences). Democratic 
consolidation, furthermore, comprises five arenas (7-12): civil society, 
political society, rule of law, a useable bureaucracy, and economic 
society. They also contributed to the field with a classification scheme 
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of actors, leadership, and regime types that subsequently shape the 
transition path of a given case. 
In recent decades, scholars began to adopt a more critical stance 
regarding the central assumption in the democratization literature that 
transitions are moving toward democracy. Avoiding the genetic 
questions that Rustow once proposed, Steven Levitsky and Lucan Way 
(2002) focus on functional questions and consider how transitions may 
lead to ‘hybrid’ nondemocratic regimes. Levitsky and Way worried 
about the “democratizating bias” in the transitions literature, adding 
that it was “overly optimistic” (51, 64). Their healthy skepticism was a 
central concern in the literature around the time of the initial color 
revolutions in the ‘real world’. 
I will base my methodological framework from the 
democratization literature. I discuss how concepts of democracy will 
relate to the research in the next chapter. 
 
2.6 Research Agenda and Theoretical Framework 
 
 Contemporary scholars who have explicitly refuted or supported 
the notion of the EU as a unitary actor in foreign policy base their 
claim on their respective analyses of competing and divergent national 
interests among the member-states. For scholars who are optimistic of 
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the EU, this implies that common ground among member-states in a 
particular policy issue is sufficient for the EU to act as a unitary actor. 
This research contributes to the discussion by analyzing an additional 
layer to determine if the EU is a unitary actor: divergent institutional 
powers and interests within the EU itself. Thus inter-institutional 
common ground is necessary in addition to common ground between 
member-states in a given policy area.  
Theories on international relations and integration reveal the 
tenuous balance between states and international institutions, and 
between structure and agency. And scholarly contributions to the 
topics of conditionality, leverage, and the role of the EU in Central and 
Eastern Europe suggest that the EU has very limited “soft” influence in 
regions further east, where states have little intent or possibility of 
joining the EU—the “magnet” and “carrot” of membership is virtually 
nonexistent. The EU can, however, exercise “hard” conditionality 
through more traditional disincentives, namely punitive policies such 
as withholding aid. The democratization literature provides a basis for 
understanding each institution’s conceptualization of democracy, as 
revealed by the discourse. 
This study builds a research agenda across different theoretical 
debates. The results of the study will impart a theoretical discussion 
regarding international relations, the role of the state, the 
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development of institutions and institutional authority, and the power 
of foreign policy and conditionality. It contributes to mainstream 
international relations theory by arguing that international institutions 
need not be solely vehicles of state interest; instead states can find 
common ground for cooperation. Also, there may be limits to how 
liberal institutionalists explain the role of institutions relative to their 
constituent states.  
This research will treat the EU and its member-states as 
potentially unitary actors in foreign affairs. Furthermore, institutions 
develop identities and construct meanings through norms and 
discourse. For the development of EU institutions, this means that 
“spillover” is not inevitable, but instead is punctuated by the growing 
pains of institutional change and adjustment. Such institutional 
dynamics are evident in cases where states are less incentivized to 
follow conditionality policies despite apparent power asymmetries. The 
concluding chapter will return to these issues and address theoretical 
implications.   
The next chapter will discuss the methodological framework 
behind this research. It will propose qualitative methods to uncover 
the extent to which institutions promote or hinder the EU as an actor 
in the international community and in foreign policy.  
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Chapter 3: Research Methods 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
To determine whether the institutions of the EU have different 
stakes in foreign affairs and to determine when a particular institution 
employs democratic discourse, this research utilizes interpretive, 
qualitative content and discourse analysis of EU institutional 
documents from an extensive database built for this study. It explores 
how the EU produces and constructs democratic norms through formal 
discourse on post-Soviet states. The study relates to how EU 
institutions use discursive resources to publicly delineate their stance 
in foreign matters. Institutional documents reflect an official posturing 
of that stance, representative of the institution as a whole rather than 
representative of an actor within. In this chapter, I outline the 
research methods that will uncover essential inter-institutional 
dynamics in the EU. I address the following issues: first, the research 
questions; second, the hypothesized relationship between variables; 
third, the research design; fourth, the specific research steps involved; 
and, finally, concluding remarks on methodological trade-offs. 
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3.2 The Problem and the Questions 
 
 Despite the prominent role of the EU as a unitary global actor in 
the political, economic, and social transitions of the post-Soviet 
satellites in Central and Eastern Europe, the notion of the EU as a 
unitary global actor is far from settled. This study argues that 
divergent institutional interests undermine the EU on the world stage. 
To examine these dynamics, it observes democratic discourse in EU 
documents of three leading institutions across three case studies, and 
poses the following questions. 
 
Q1 How are EU relations with former Soviet non-member-
states portrayed by each institution? What are the roles, 
powers, and interests of the institutions in such cases? 
 
Q2 To what extent do the institutions of the EU converge or 
diverge in approaches to foreign policy? Do the different 
institutions of the EU promote or hinder the EU’s ability to 
act as a global unitary actor? 
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Q3 How do the institutions of the EU construct democratic 
discourse in each case? What are the patterns of discourse 
across EU institutions?  
 
Q4 Why do EU institutions vary in their approaches to foreign 
affairs? What explains points of divergence or 
convergence? 
 
3.3 Hypothesis  
 
This research assesses the impact of institutional power levels 
and stakes abroad (explanatory variables) as evident in democratic 
discourse used in foreign policy (outcome variable). The outcome 
variable seeks to capture EU institutional (dis)unity in policy. 
The institutions of the EU have different stakes and vested 
interests at risk in foreign policy commitments and outcomes; the 
greater the stake, the less democratic rhetoric is used. That is, the 
institutional actor with the lowest stakes in outcomes, the Parliament, 
will be most likely to use democratic discourse in reference to the non-
member-state in question, because the limited impact of its discourse 
on reform in target states and limited accountability allow it to make 
bolder statements. Lower stakes in outcomes also allow the institution, 
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in this case the Parliament, to pursue its own interests within the EU 
itself. As the only democratically elected body in the EU, the 
Parliament can foster identity formation as the beacon of democratic 
discourse and thus reflect its internal origins and character. The 
Parliament forms and reinforces its identity as a democratic institution 
by constructing narratives and pursuing interests commensurate with 
democracy—particularly by way of democratic discourse. This study 
will demonstrate instances of such narratives in the case studies. 
This inverse relationship is hypothesized to be the case, since 
greater institutional authority abroad based on the legally binding 
treaties of the EU leads to greater responsibility and accountability. 
Conversely, if an institution has less authority in foreign affairs, then it 
faces fewer repercussions when using democratic discourse, as it will 
likely not be held accountable for the fulfillment of such norms in 
relationships with target states. This contrast between greater and 
lesser authority reflects an inherent trade-off for realpolitik, whereby 
more powerful institutions consider the pragmatic ramifications of 
discourse. Pragmatic ramifications matter for the more powerful 
institutions, because their ability to exert pressure over a target state 
relies on power asymmetries (see earlier discussion in § 2.4 on 
conditionality).  
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Because the meaning of democracy is unsettled and even 
contested in the EU (to be discussed in §3.4.3 on the conceptualization 
of democracy), each institution can use democratic discourse at its 
discretion. If an institution has less authority in foreign affairs, 
however, the institution risks fewer repercussions when using 
democratic discourse, as it will likely not be held accountable for the 
fulfillment of democratic norms in EU relationships with nondemocratic 
states.  
 
3.4 Research Design  
  
This research seeks to uncover the construction of democracy 
across EU institutions through discourse. It looks to case studies 
outside the EU, because discursive meaning emerges from the focus 
on “others”, which allows for the “development of intersubjective 
understandings […] intersubjectivities occur in the context of 
communicative action involving processes of persuasion and advocacy 
that go beyond the utilitarian exchange of preferences…” (Rosamond 
1999, 659). This research searches for intersubjectivity by identifying 
how democracy is conceptualized vis-à-vis Ukraine, Georgia, and 
Kyrgyzstan through an iterative process. Furthermore, if the 
Commission, the Council, and the Parliament display similar 
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discourses, then the prospects for institutional cohesion and the ability 
of the EU to act as a unitary actor abroad are more favorable. If the 
three institutions fail to display similar discourses and instead 
demonstrate very different priorities and concerns, then the reverse is 
likely.   
This section of the chapter explains how documents were 
selected and analyzed in terms of the research questions. First, it 
outlines the overarching strategies that frame the research design. 
Second, it presents the specific methodological tools used in the 
research. Third, it presents the case selection over which the 
methodology was executed. Fourth, it outlines the specific data used, 
including parameters and selection. 
 
3.4.1.Methodological Strategies 
 
 Before outlining specific methodological parameters, I will 
explain the overall strategies applied. This research was driven by the 
following overall strategies: diachronic and synchronic strategies to 
capture time and space; and exploratory research techniques. First, to 
test the hypothesis, this research used a dual approach—diachronic 
and synchronic strategies. Diachronic research observes democratic 
discourse across time and over the span of nine years (2003-2011). In 
this study, the purpose of the diachronic component is to capture the 
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impact of context on discourse, as well as the gradual nature of 
discursive constructions of meaning (Malmvig 2006, 30). Synchronic 
research, on the other hand, observes democratic discourse across 
space. In this study, the purpose of a synchronic component is to 
capture a particular moment that transpired across space and which 
ought to have been most ripe for democratic discourse: the color 
revolutions. The two strategies are complementary yet distinct; the 
former allows for observing the dynamic and gradual nature of 
democratic discourse, such as changes in what is included or excluded 
in discourse over time and patterns, while the latter allows for 
democratic discourse to be captured during a particularly receptive 
point in recent history. 
 Second, when researchers embark on the theoretical and 
empirical world, they construct research designs characterized by 
confirmatory or exploratory strategies (Gerring 2001, 155). As the 
labels suggest, confirmatory research “envisions empirical analysis as 
a process of confirming or disconfirming a previously stipulated 
hypothesis,” while exploratory research is “a process of mutual 
adjustment” between concepts, theories, and evidence with the goal of 
discovery (231). Researchers tend to fall in between the two extremes 
(155, 230-232), though this research leans toward the latter. This is 
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because—more often than not—the puzzles of inquiry in social science 
are too complex to be reduced to standards of natural science.  
Exploratory approaches value knowledge through understanding 
the complexities of the empirical world. Exploratory qualitative 
researchers point to the contributions of interpretivist Clifford Geertz 
(1973), who was known as a proponent of “thick description.” He paid 
close attention to context, especially cultural, which he described as a 
“web of significance” (5). Another source of influence is the argument 
by Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann (1966, 39), who do not seek 
to eliminate subjectivity and instead offer the example of language as 
a source of both objectivity and subjectivity.   
  
3.4.2 Specific Methodological Tools 
 
 Within the interpretivist paradigm outlined above, this research 
employed an iterative process of qualitative content and discourse 
analysis as methodological tools. Defined simply, content analysis is 
“organizing information into categories related to the central questions 
of the research” (Bowen 2009, 32), while discourse analysis is the 
study of written texts or spoken language (Peräkylä and Ruusuvuori 
2011, 530). The purpose is to use iterative readings of institutional 
documents to uncover themes and meanings (531). The texts 
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therefore serve as “specimen” or data of the world the researcher is 
exploring (531).  
 Qualitative content analysis, as used in this research, is distinct 
from traditional quantitative content analysis. The latter uses random 
selection (for statistical validity) to count word usage and later tests it 
for statistical significance (Zhang and Wildemuth 2009, 2). The former, 
on the other hand, purposively selects texts to identify categories, 
patterns, and meanings (2). In this research, qualitative content 
analysis is part of the initial stages of research, particularly data 
selection.  
Discourse analysis plays a predominant role in the empirical 
analysis phases of research. According to Stuart Hall (1997), meanings 
are produced and circulated through culture and language. Two ways 
of assessing such meanings, he argues, are through semiotic research 
(which systematically studies how signs and language serve as the 
‘vehicle’ for meaning in culture) and through discursive research. Hall 
(1997, 6) defines discourses as “ways of referring to or constructing 
knowledge about a particular topic of practice,” which “define what is 
and is not appropriate in our formulation of, and our practices in 
relation to, a particular subject.” Thus, while semiotics contemplates 
the ‘how’ of language, discourse contemplates the ‘effects’ of it (Hall 
1997).  
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Discourse analysis was executed systematically across the case 
studies by carefully examining the immediate and wider contexts of 
the document; by identifying which dimensions of democracy were 
emphasized and which were not emphasized; and by determining 
patterns, convergences, and divergences across institutions. The text 
was deconstructed to infer meaning and to reveal overarching themes 
beyond the document itself. The specific ways in which these 
methodologies were applied are elaborated in section IV of this 
chapter. 
 
3.4.3 Key Concepts 
 
The core concepts of this study are rooted in academic debates 
and literature. The following sections capture key concepts of this 
research. 
Democracy, Democratic Discourse, and Democratic Norms 
The EU’s political criteria for membership require stable 
institutions that can guarantee democracy, the rule of law, and human 
rights. The EU, however, never defines democracy explicitly and 
instead relies on subjective assessments to monitor criteria fulfillment. 
The closest semblance to a definition of democracy is the EU 
Commission’s 1999 description of democratization (Table 1). This 
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definition is neither authoritative nor representative of the EU position 
as a whole, since there is no common position on the definition of 
democracy. 
 
Table 1: European Commission Regulation on Democratization 
Processes, 1999 
(a) promoting and strengthening the rule of law 
(b) promoting the separation of powers 
(c) promoting pluralism both at the political level and at the level of 
civil society by strengthening the institutions needed to maintain 
the pluralist nature of that society 
(d) promoting good governance 
(e) promoting the participation of the people in the decision-making 
process at national 
(f) support for electoral processes 
(g) supporting national efforts to separate civilian and military 
functions 
Source: European Commission 
 
The EU stance on what democracy means is a mostly procedural 
notion with a few substantive elements, but this research questions 
how democracy is constructed and conceptualized vis-à-vis cases in 
post-Soviet space. Due to the lack of an operational definition by the 
EU, the working definition for democracy in my research was rooted in 
the academic literature. 
Larry Diamond and Leonard Morlino (2004; also Przeworski 
1999) identify four minimal requisites for democracy: “1) universal, 
adult suffrage; 2) recurring, free, competitive, and fair elections; 3) 
more than one serious political party; and 4) alternative sources of 
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information” (21). Beyond the minimal requisites, they add notions of 
democratic quality to their framework, such as substantive content 
and results. This research utilizes the insights of Diamond and Morlino 
as an operational basis for research. Their conceptualization of 
democracy is influenced by both institutional and procedural 
perspectives, and the dimensions and indicators they use stem from 
experiences following the third wave of democratization.  
Although the EU neither defines nor commits to a specific 
definition, its stated conceptualization of democratization does indeed 
reveal a baseline adherence to procedural elements very similar to 
those of Diamond and Morlino. The Diamond and Morlino framework 
offers viable indicators and theoretical grounding for this analysis. 
Based on their framework, the following indicators will be useful during 
the review of empirical textual data (Diamond and Morlino 2004): rule 
of law can be identified through references to legal and judicial 
structures, and legal rights and clarity; political participation is evident 
through references to enfranchisement, political parties, civil society, 
and political discourse; political competition is linked to electoral 
references; and accountability may be described as inter-institutional 
or via free media and information. 
 To complement Diamond and Morlino, this study also draws 
indicators from a collaborative effort between various scholars in the 
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field (Coppedge et al. 2011). They disaggregate several 
conceptualizations of democracy into component parts and into viable 
indicators for research. The 33 indicators they present range from 
procedural to substantive elements of democracy. Table 2 synthesizes 
the indicators of democracy for this research based on the 
contributions of Diamond and Morlino, and Coppedge et al. This table 
serves as the operational framework and conceptual basis of 
democracy in the research.  
 
Table 2: Indicators of Democracy 
Dimension of 
Democracy 
Indicators (Where to look for the 
dimension) 
Rule of Law and 
Sovereignty 
 Legal system 
 State institutions 
 Courts 
 Basic rights 
 Equality under the Law 
 Legal clarity and predictability 
 Executive’s adherence to law 
 Legal authority extends throughout the 
territory claimed as part of the polity 
 Polity is able to govern itself in domestic and 
foreign policies without external interference 
Participation  Enfranchisement  
 Participation in political parties 
 Political discourse 
 Political culture tolerates diversity 
 Access to basic education 
 Level of participation in elections 
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Table 2 (Continued): Indicators of Democracy 
Dimension of 
Democracy 
Indicators (Where to look for the 
dimension) 
Competition 
(National and 
subnational levels) 
 Regular, free, fair, on time elections 
 Independent electoral commission 
 Candidate access to the ballot 
 Competition without government interference 
 Votes counted and allocated fairly 
 Candidate access to media 
 Party institutionalism and centralized 
 Defined, consistent, and coherent party 
ideology 
 Lack of barriers for small party 
representation 
Vertical 
Accountability 
(Leader is 
accountable to 
citizen) 
 Major media outlets are free and 
independent 
 
Horizontal 
Accountability 
(Inter-institutional 
monitoring and 
separation of 
powers) 
 Checks and balances by independent 
authorities  
 Highest judicial bodies are independent of 
the outside influences 
 Highest judicial bodies can review 
governmental actions in light of 
constitutional provisions 
 Institutional decisions respected by the other 
institutions 
 Separation of civilian and military 
Civil Society and 
Political Freedoms 
 Freedoms are properly protected 
 Citizens enjoy freedom of speech and 
freedom from politically motivated 
persecution by government 
 Property rights are protected 
 Freedom of religion is guaranteed 
 Civil society is independent of the state and 
able to voice opinions critical of politics 
 Civil society is engaged in politics 
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Table 2 (Continued): Indicators of Democracy 
Dimension of 
Democracy 
Indicators (Where to look for the 
dimension) 
Progressive Politics  Addressing social inequalities 
 Access to income, education, and health 
resources 
 Women achieve equal representation in 
government 
 Underprivileged ethnic groups are granted 
formal rights and their representation 
 Citizens and permanent residents enjoy the 
protections of the law  
Responsiveness  Citizen satisfaction and democratic 
legitimacy 
Sources: Diamond and Morlino (2004), Coppedge et al. (2011) 
 
To summarize, the following definitions will hold for this 
research. 
 Democratic Discourse: conceptualized as communication that 
addresses democracy, as defined above. It is operationalized as 
textual references to the EU’s views on democratization, as 
outlined in Table 1, and as textual references to the operational 
terms outlined in Table 2. 
 Democratic Norms: conceptualized as “rules for conduct that 
provide standards by which behavior is approved or disapproved” 
(Hechter 1987, 62). It is operationalized as textual references to 
the “indicators” listed in Table 2.  
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Institutional Authority and Power 
Institutions are defined in this study as a set of rules and 
constraints that shape interaction and outcomes (North 1990, 3; Jones 
et al. 2003, 153-154). Institutional authority and power is an 
institution’s ability to demand and enforce. One way authority and 
power is commonly exercised by the EU is conditionality, or external 
leverage. Conditionality is the "exercise of policy instruments by one 
party to secure compliance and shape the actions of another party,” as 
described earlier in this study, and it can be formal or informal. The 
former can be identified when conditions or pre-conditions are publicly 
stated, whereas the latter manifests through recommendations or 
pressure rather than explicit prerequisites. 
Institutional Stakes    
Stakes are conceptualized as the vested interests of institutions 
regarding outcomes. References to ‘institutional stakes’ will mean the 
vested interests at risk in the outcome. Stakes will be identified 
according to what the institution perceives it stands to gain relative to 
what it stands to lose. The first measure of perceived loss will be 
competing issues on the institution’s agenda (Levitsky and Way 2005, 
21). In the Commission, a competing interest is the prospect of 
membership in a target state, since the Commission is the primary 
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institution that leads membership negotiations. In the Council, a 
competing interest is immigration or energy resources, since the 
member-states channel national concerns through the Council. In the 
Parliament, a competing interest is gaining more institutional power 
relative to the other institutions, since it remains the weakest of the 
three in decision-making. The second measure of perceived loss, or 
stakes, will be the level of linkage to the target state (case study). 
Linkages are observable in levels of economic (investments, 
assistance), geopolitical (ties to Western organizations), and social 
(tourism, migration) ties to the EU (Levitsky and Way 2005, 22).  
 
3.4.4 Case Selection 
 
To examine the research questions, this study selected three 
cases to observe how institutions (the units of analysis) construct 
democracy outside the EU. The following criteria for case selection 
applied.  
First, the case had to be a non-member-state in post-Soviet 
space. This criterion is based on precedence that the EU acts most 
cohesively in democratization promotion efforts in Central Eastern 
Europe (the newest member-states of the EU). Second, the case had 
to have little immediate prospects for EU membership. “Immediate 
prospects” is defined as any formal indication or early sign of 
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membership negotiation, specifically whether the EU formally 
categorizes a country as a “candidate” (countries officially allowed to 
begin the long membership process) or “potential candidate” 
(countries that have been publicly promised the possibility of 
membership in the future). The membership process is very gradual 
and formalized, and only Croatia, Iceland, Macedonia, Montenegro, 
and Turkey are current candidates who have embarked on 
membership negotiations. In 2003, furthermore, the EU formally 
endorsed Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia, and Montenegro as 
future members of the EU; the EU publicly classifies these countries as 
potential candidates. This second criterion is based on the premise 
that the EU enjoys more conditionality and leverage, due to the lure of 
membership, in cases designated as potential candidates.  
Third, the country and the EU had to have active engagement 
with each other. Active engagement is defined as one with a relevant 
regional framework in effect (the European Neighborhood Policy for 
Ukraine and Georgia, and the Central Asia Strategy for Kyrgyzstan, as 
well as regular bilateral negotiations on domestic and international 
affairs). Active engagement reflects ongoing cooperation rather than 
sporadic and limited talks (an instance of the latter is Belarus, with 
which the EU restricts cooperation). It also indicates that there are 
costs and gains at stake in the relationship. Two sets of existing EU 
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regional policy fit the third criterion: the Central Asia Strategy (which 
covers Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and 
Uzbekistan), and the Eastern Partnership (which includes Armenia, 
Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine). The remaining 
regional frameworks of the EU were excluded, because their scopes 
extended beyond the research and included numerous countries 
outside former Soviet space. This third criterion is based on data 
availability from which to draw discursive findings; if relations are 
limited such that discourse is limited, then identifying patterns of 
discourse may not be possible. 
The final criterion was to identify crucial case studies based on a 
most-likely design (Gawrich et al. 2010; George and Bennett 2005)—
that is, cases most likely to elicit democratic discourse from the EU. 
Three major cases of ‘color revolutions’, or large-scale movements 
espousing democratization, were selected: Georgia, Ukraine, and 
Kyrgyzstan. The three cases provide variance on the explanatory 
variables—institutional power and stake abroad—as well. If 
institutional power is considered an institution’s ability to demand and 
enforce (exemplified in EU conditionality), then EU institutional power 
would likely be higher in places where it is unrivaled. The primary rival 
for political influence in the region is Russia, and Russia enjoys the 
most diplomatic leverage in Kyrgyzstan, notable leverage in Ukraine, 
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and less diplomatic leverage in Georgia, relative to one another. 
Conversely, the lure of EU membership and partnership is highest in 
Georgia, notable in Ukraine, and least in Kyrgyzstan. For reasons 
outlined in this section, the final case selection is Georgia, Ukraine, 
and the Kyrgyz Republic. This final criterion is conducive to a most-
likely scenario, in which the color revolutions may present a potentially 
rich context to explore patterns of democratic discourse, and in which 
a lack thereof would similarly indicate important implications. 
 
3.4.5 Data Selection 
 
This research uses texts representative of the three EU 
institutions: the Commission, the Council, and the Parliament. 
Institutional documents are central data, because “discourses are 
embodied in texts” and “discourse analysis involves the systematic 
study of texts to find evidence of their meaning and how this meaning 
translates into a social reality” (Hardy et al. 2004, 20). The 
parameters of the text documents (data selection) include: release by 
one of the three EU institutions; a focus on the selected case study 
regions as a whole or the specific country; and addresses foreign 
affairs from the perspective of one of the qualifying EU institutions 
(rather than NGO perspectives on humanitarian issues, for instance). 
Non-institutional document sources, such as media coverage, are 
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excluded because the research questions institutional and formal 
discourse. Text data from speech acts are only included if they present 
an official discourse on behalf of one of the three institutional entities, 
and if they were subsequently officially released as text documents. 
Therefore, texts from speech acts that do not officially represent an 
institution are excluded. The data must be authored and released by 
one of the following institutions. 
1. EU Commission (‘the Commission’): The Commission is the 
most supranational of the institutions.  
2. Council of the European Union (‘the Council’, not to be 
confused with the ‘European Council’): The Council is the most 
intergovernmental institution, because national ministers 
represent national interests and meet in a given policy area to 
make EU decisions. 
3. European Parliament (‘the Parliament’): The EP is the only 
directly-elected institution of the EU. There are 754 members 
that represent 500 million citizens across 27 member-states 
for 5 year terms.  
 
The data selection is thus based on time (2003-2011), space 
(case study selection), and unit of analysis (institution). Based on 
these criteria, a database was created. The source of all textual data 
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included in the database is the electronic archives of the European 
Union. This process is described in the next section.  
 
3.5 Building the Database 
 
For each of the three institutions in question, data were collected 
and stored in the qualitative analysis software program, Atlas.ti, which 
was used to manage all data for the research. Atlas.ti is Qualitative 
Data Analysis software designed for unstructured data—that is, data 
not amenable to statistical analysis. It allows the researcher to 
organize, code, track, and visualize very large quantities of primary 
data. 
For the research, data were collected from official EU archival 
sources via official web portals according to the following criteria: (1) 
the document must be officially authored and released by the 
Commission, the Council, or the Parliament; (2) the document must 
relate to Georgia, the Caucasus, Ukraine, the European Neighborhood 
Policy, the Kyrgyz Republic, or Central Asia; and (3) the document 
must fit into the 2003-2011 time frame.  
To summarize the complex process, thousands of documents 
were collected and compiled into a raw database of data meeting the 
three basic criteria. The raw database of 3,014 pieces of data was 
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coded with democracy-related codes, and then content analysis was 
used to filter out those documents lacking democracy-related codes. 
After using content analysis, the filtered database shrank to 2,410 
pieces of data. The final step was to use qualitative analysis of the 
codes to select 230 documents for review from the raw database. 
Thus, content analysis allowed for filtering the database, while 
qualitative review allowed for the final data selection. The filtered 
database was used throughout the research as the reference database, 
although the 230 documents ultimately served as the data for 
qualitative discourse analysis.  
 
3.5.1 From Raw Database to Filtered Database  
The criteria yielded a total of 3,014 documents—1,243 for the 
Commission; 1,573 for the Council; and 198 for the Parliament. The 
numerical discrepancy between institutional sources—particularly the 
Parliament—should not be methodologically alarming for reasons 
described later in this chapter. The 3,014 documents comprised the 
initial database of raw data in Atlas.ti. This initial raw database would 
undergo further filters to eventually yield the final database for 
research.  
Once the raw database was established with documents meeting 
the three criteria listed above, the next step was coding. Coding in 
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Atlas.ti is akin to highlighting textual references in hard copies. The 
purpose of coding is to set the foundation for content analysis, which 
relies on a qualitative review of word occurrences and frequencies. The 
codes were based on the conceptualization of democracy from Table 2. 
A list of codes and the corresponding keywords use to generate them 
can be found in the codebook in Table 3. 
 
 
Table 3: Atlas.ti Codes (Codebook) 
Indicator Code Name Corresponding Atlas.ti 
Keywords for Coding 
Georgia CASE::GEORGIA “georgi*”, “caucas*” 
Ukraine CASE::UKRAINE “ukrain*” 
Kyrgyzstan CASE::KYRGYZREP “kyrgy*”, “kirghiz*”, 
“kirgiz*”, “central asia*” 
Democracy 00DEMOCRACY “democra*”  
Rule of Law 
and 
Sovereignty 
01RULEOFLAWSOV “rule of law”, “sovereign*”, 
“court” , “rights” , , 
“equal*”, “territor*”, 
“judicia*”, “laws”, “legal*” 
Participation 02PARTICIPATION “particip*”, “political 
participation”, “civic 
participation”, “*franchis*”, 
“suffrage”, “diversity”, 
“education”, “elect*” 
Competition 
(National and 
Subnational) 
03COMPETITION “elect*”, “political 
competition”, “party 
competition”, “electoral 
commission”, “ballot*”, 
“vot*”, “media”, “party”, 
“parties” 
Vertical 
Accountability 
04VERTACCOUNTAB “media”, “news”, 
“internet”, “accountab*” 
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Table 3 (Continued): Atlas.ti Codes (Codebook) 
Indicator Code Name Corresponding Atlas.ti 
Keywords for Coding 
Horizontal 
Accountability 
05HORIZACCOUNTAB “separation of powers”, 
“accountab*”, “independent 
institutions”, “institutional 
independence”, 
“institutions are 
independent”, “institution is 
independent”, “check*”, 
“judicial review”, “civilian*” 
Civil Society 
and Political 
Freedoms 
06CIVSOCPOLFREE “civil society”, “freedom*”, 
“freedom of”, “freedom 
from”, “property rights”, 
“plural*” 
Progressive 
Politics 
07PROGRESSIVEPOL “progressive”, “social”, 
“income”, “*employ*”, 
“educat*”, “health”, 
“human”, “women*”, 
“female”, “gender”, 
“ethnic”, “minority”, 
“underprivileged”, 
“underrepresented”, 
“divers*”, “plural*” 
Responsiveness 08RESPONSIVENESS “responsive*”, “legitima*”, 
“satisf*” 
Sources: Codebook based on concepts from Diamond and Morlino (2004), and 
Coppedge et al. (2011) 
 
Once the database of 3,014 documents was fully coded 
according to the codebook (Table 3), the next step was to utilize 
qualitative content analysis to eliminate documents without any of the 
democracy-related codes. Qualitative content analysis requires 
categories and a coding scheme to be developed (Zhang and 
Wildemuth 2009, 4), in this case deductively from the theoretical 
framework on democracy. The codes were checked for consistency in a 
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sample of text first, a “test run”. The testing phase demonstrated that 
the European Union addresses democracy-related issues in an often 
direct manner, and it revealed that the codebook developed for this 
research project would be appropriate for generating an appropriate 
amount of data.  
Once the sample text was tested, the codes were applied to the 
entire database. The codes were executed in Atlas.ti in a two-part 
process. First, the system was programmed to auto code the indicators 
of democracy from the codebook (numbers 01-08), a process which 
consisted of programming the software with each code and its 
constituent keywords, followed by a very time-consuming process of 
the software scanning each and every word across the 3,014 
documents. Second, code “00DEMOCRACY”, which is the explicit use of 
variants of the word ‘democracy’, was not autocoded. Instead, every 
single occurrence of the code was manually reviewed to omit irrelevant 
usage, such as a reference to the “Democratic Republic of the Congo”. 
Relevance and irrelevance was judged according to one question 
alone: is the use of “democra*” pertaining to one of the case studies? 
If not, the phrase would not be coded “00DEMOCRACY”; if so, it would 
be labeled as such. 
Once this two-step process was complete, the database was fully 
labeled with all codes from the codebook in Table 3. Keeping in mind 
79 
 
that all documents in the raw database already met the case study and 
temporal scope parameters, the coding process revealed close to a 
third of the documents did not contain any reference to the nine 
democracy-related terms from the codebook, as well as their 
indicators. These documents were removed from the database, which 
yielded the filtered database [Table 4(B)]. A summary of how the 
database developed is displayed in Table 4. Column one identifies the 
stage of the database and data selection process; column two provides 
the total number of data; column three provides a breakdown by 
institution; and column four lists the quantity of codes in the database. 
 
Table 4: Database and Data Selection 
 Total 
Docs 
Total Docs by 
Institution 
Total Occurrences Across 
Data 
(A) Raw 
database 
3,014 Commission: 1,243 
Council: 1,573 
Parliament: 198 
 
00DEMOCRACY: 450 
 
01RULEOFLAWSOV: 17,853 
02PARTICIPATION: 12,836 
03COMPETITION: 9,301 
04VERTACCOUNTAB: 3,341 
05HORIZACCOUNTAB: 2,886 
06CIVSOCPOLFREE: 2,133 
07PROGRESSIVEPOL: 22,676 
08RESPONSIVENESS: 1,098 
(B) Filtered 
Database 
After 
deleting 
data without 
coding 
2,410 Commission: 953 
Council: 1,321 
Parliament: 136 
 
(C) Data 
with Coded 
Democratic 
Discourse & 
Case Study 
230 Commission: 100 
Council: 82 
Parliament: 48 
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The filtered database, Section “B”, was used as the dataset for 
this research, while data from Section “C” were those emphasized for 
discursive analysis. Data from Section “C” contain the code 
“00DEMOCRACY”, which is the explicit reference to democracy 
(“democra*”) and a case study as determined from a qualitative 
content review of the data. 
 
This research questions the limits of the EU as a unitary actor in 
the world stage by examining convergences and divergences in 
institutional democratic discourse regarding non-member-states in 
post-Soviet space during the years 2003-2011. It expects a negative 
relationship between institutional authority abroad and levels of 
democratic discourse. The research design uses qualitative content 
and discourse analysis methodologies to examine three major 
institutions of the EU—the Commission, Council, and Parliament—as 
evident in three case studies—Georgia, Ukraine, and the Kyrgyz 
Republic. The analysis is based on deductive reasoning from 
theoretical frameworks on democracy. The data were compiled into a 
database. They were stored, organized, and analyzed using Atlas.ti 
Qualitative Data Analysis software. 
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3.6 Potential Limitations of Methodology 
 
The main drawbacks in this research stem from the limited scope 
of EU relations with the cases relative to EU relations elsewhere in 
former Soviet space, such as the former republics of Yugoslavia. The 
EU, however, has substantially increased ties to the case studies. Also, 
the very different historical contexts of the Caucasus, Eastern 
European, and Central Asia make comparison difficult. Though close 
qualitative sensitivity to such differences helps mitigate the issue, this 
research does not compare the case studies to one another, but rather 
compares the institutions. This is precisely why the cases serve as 
vignettes or snapshots of EU institutional involvement. Another 
tradeoff stems from the selection of official institutional documents as 
data, as opposed to interviews, for instance. I argue that official 
documents are the public representation of how the EU interacts with 
non-member-states, and it is therefore an important place to explore 
how the EU addresses key themes.  
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Chapter 4: Context of the European Union and Case Studies 
 
This chapter presents the domestic and international contexts of 
the European Union and case studies during the time period of this 
project. One of the crucial elements of discursive analysis is that it 
accepts “a dynamic relationship between text and the context in which 
the text is produced”, and it “situates texts in their social, cultural, 
political, and historical context” (Cheek 2004, 1144-1145). This 
chapter is divided in three main parts: the context of the EU relative to 
the rest of the world, the context of the EU internally, and the context 
of the three case studies. The chapter concludes with the larger 
significance of context for this project before proceeding to the next 
chapter on data findings. 
  
4.1 The European Union on the Global Stage 
 
 The years 2003 to 2011 were volatile around the world. 
Terrorism was a major issue of concern in the West following the 
attacks of September 11 especially, plus the Madrid bombings in 2004 
and the London attacks in 2005. The decade culminated with the 
sudden and momentous upheavals of the Arab Awakening in late 2010 
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and 2011. From 2003 to 2011, the EU deferred sensitive defense and 
security policy issues to the member-states. Members could act 
through the Council of Ministers on behalf of state interests, or they 
could act individually as independent countries. Therefore, security and 
defense issues such as these were never part of the EU supranational 
agenda and they were prone to internal differences. Indeed, the 
controversy among EU members regarding the proper response to the 
world’s most prominent security challenges suggests a deep reluctance 
to cede foreign policy authority outside traditional state channels. 
 The US-led multilateral intervention in Afghanistan in 2001 
became a policy priority for many member-states. Though most 
member-states individually contributed troops to the International 
Security Assistance Force through NATO, the EU’s primary involvement 
in Afghanistan as an institution followed the fall of the Taliban and 
consisted of political and economic assistance (Ross 2012, 109). The 
EU assisted with reconstruction funds, humanitarian aid, social 
services, and election support (109-110).  
The US-led invasion of Iraq in 2003, however, was more 
controversial for the EU and its constituent members. The EU’s primary 
involvement in Iraq after 2003 was in a humanitarian capacity, such as 
active involvement in the UN oil-for-food program (Toje 2008, 118-
119). The question of whether to support US use of force in Iraq was 
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highly divisive for EU members. European opposition was led by 
powerhouses France and Germany (Archick 2005, 6). Iraq exposed 
disunity within the EU that culminated with rancor in the open press 
between opponents and supporters of US use of force, the latter of 
which included Great Britain and many of the new member-states 
(124). 
Though projecting security and military power is not a strong 
suit of the EU, it has on some occasions asserted a collective security 
role. In the 2000s, the EU sent peacekeeping, security, and border 
missions to various locations such as Africa and the Balkans, albeit to 
limited scales and intensities (Bickerton 2011, 4-5; Toje 2011, 51). 
The EU as an organization did not participate beyond assistance and 
humanitarian roles in many of the decade’s most prominent security 
challenges, such as Kosovo and Darfur, and, as mentioned before, Iraq 
and Afghanistan (Toje 2011, 51). Instead, individual EU member-
states acted independently through their respective foreign ministries. 
Another major concern for the EU on the global stage was 
relations with Russia, especially when it came to EU affairs in former 
Soviet space. The EU had a “Russia first” policy at the time, in which 
relations with Russia took precedence over the former Soviet republics 
that comprised the Commonwealth of Independent States (Emerson et 
al. 2005, 16). The fear that EU involvement in the region would 
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undermine or offend relations with Russia was pronounced with 
Ukraine especially, but also elsewhere in Russia’s backyard (Kuzio 
2006, 95). Russia was also an alternative model to the stringent 
requirements of Western democracy, especially in contrast to the 
reforms required of the new member states in Central Europe. This 
was implicit in Russia’s support for and endorsement of fraudulent and 
flawed elections in the post-Soviet world, and explicit in its material 
support for forces that undermined progress toward Western 
standards.  
Iran was another major—and sensitive—element of EU foreign 
affairs during this time. Negotiations with Iran over illicit nuclear 
activity were led by Germany, France, and the United Kingdom outside 
EU channels, but the High Representative for the CFSP intermittently 
joined talks on behalf of the Council of the EU (Bergenäs 2010, 491).  
Among the most notable and relevant issues going on in the 
world during this time frame were the democratic and economic 
transitions of the former Soviet satellites. The EU was responding to a 
great deal of geopolitical flux along its periphery following the collapse 
of communism that began in 1989. That year, the EU was pressured to 
respond to a new political era when communism collapsed in Central 
Eastern Europe, as it became evident that many former Soviet 
satellites would seek the West for security, growth, and stability.  
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In anticipation of the accession of new members as well as the 
reality of a post-Cold War era, the EU actively exercised carrot-and-
stick leverage in the Baltics, Central Europe, and even the Balkans. By 
the late 1990s, it became evident that as many as ten former satellites 
would fulfill the membership requirements, known as the Copenhagen 
Criteria. These were states that had to face pervasive economic, 
political, and social transitions prior to joining.  Aptly called the ‘big 
bang’, eight former communist countries officially joined the EU in 
2004 and another two in 2007, resulting in the largest phase of 
enlargement in EU history.  
 
4.2 Within the European Union 
 
 In 2003, on the eve of the “big bang” enlargement, the EU 
included 15 members; in 2004 it was 25, and by 2007 it was 27. The 
years preceding and following enlargement—including all the years in 
the scope of this study—required significant structural and procedural 
changes within the EU itself. As Europe grappled with the impending 
enlargement, EU members negotiated the Treaty of Nice in 2000 as an 
institutional response to enlargement, including adjusting the size, 
scope and voting structure of EU institutions (McCormick 2005, 74; 
Cameron 2003, 24).  
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 New challenges became political obstacles as well, which would 
not bode well for the color revolutions many years later. Among these 
was the sociopolitical impact of the 2004 and 2007 enlargements. 
Immigration policy in a region that lacks internal borders proved 
especially controversial (Niblett 2005, 53): "Given the ease with which 
migrants can move across borders within the EU once they have 
gained entry, governments are being forced to respond to precipitate 
rise in immigration.” These sociopolitical debates reflected cross-
cutting concerns of cheap labor and the possibility of new members 
undermining the EU’s economic performance, competitiveness and 
standards of living (43).  
The failure of the proposed EU constitutional treaty in 2005 was 
also a major turning point for the EU as an institution. Finalized in 
2004, the proposal made sweeping institutional changes in response to 
enlargement. However, the treaty required unanimous approval by all 
25 members. Referenda on the matter were rejected by voters in 
France and the Netherlands in 2005, effectively putting an end to the 
proposed treaty. The negative reaction was seen as a response to the 
effects of the 2004 enlargement round and as a "preemptive vote 
against further EU enlargement, both to the east and, most of all, 
toward Turkey" (Niblett 2005, 43).  
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 The aftermath of the 2004 and 2007 enlargements left little 
appetite for further EU involvement in the post-Soviet world, especially 
at the same scale as before. The implications of enlargement included 
the practical worries of ordinary citizens, such as fears of job losses to 
the proverbial Polish plumber. It also raised the question of the limits 
of further and future expansion, an issue complicated by Turkey’s 
candidacy looming in the background (Kuzio 2006, 91).  
Survey data from the Eurobarometer demonstrate that 
disagreement over future enlargement figured prominently during the 
years of the color revolutions. By mid-2005, support for further 
enlargement declined among EU citizens (EB 2005). Still, the internal 
split at the subnational level regarding EU enlargement was most 
prominent between the old member-states and the new member-
states—differences consistently spanned close to 25 to 30 percentage 
points (EB 2005). Almost all of the new member-states topped the list 
in levels of support while almost all of the founding members filled the 
bottom in opposition.  
Finally, monetary integration and the Euro figured prominently 
during this time period. During membership negotiations, the new 
members of the EU formally agreed to eventual adherence to the 
requirements of the Euro (Johnson 2008, 827). Integration into the 
Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), or the Eurozone, entails a set of 
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stringent fiscal criteria. Of the new post-communist member-states, 
only Slovenia (2007), Slovakia (2009), and Estonia (2011) have 
achieved full integration and adoption of the Euro. According to the 
European Commission, the EU requires the following for integration 
into Eurozone: price stability, sound and sustainable public finances, 
stable long-term interest rates, and fiscal exchange stability.  
Overall, the enthusiasm for the Euro waned through the years of 
this research, especially among the member-states who adopted the 
Euro between 1999, when the Euro was introduced—Austria, Belgium, 
Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the 
Netherlands, Portugal, and Spain (1999), and Greece (2001)—and 
2004, when the new member-states joined the EU. The “open dissent 
among older members over the benefits and viability of the euro zone” 
was the greatest obstacle for EU decision-makers in the court of public 
opinion and in the quest for interstate policy coordination (Johnson 
2008, 836). 
 
4.3 The Case Studies in Context 
 
4.3.1 Context in Georgia 
 Located in the ethnically diverse southern Caucasus region, 
Georgia is a post-Soviet republic of about four and half million people 
90 
 
(Hoe-Yeong 2011, 7). Georgia gained independence from the Soviet 
Union in 1991, and since then it has struggled to secure democratic 
reforms amid ethnic, civil, and political unrest and conflict. Georgia’s 
first leader following independence was Soviet-era Zviad 
Gamsakhurdia, who was ousted in 1992. His opponents appointed 
Soviet-era politician Eduard Shevardnadze. During the early years of 
independence, tensions grew with separatist Abkhazia and South 
Ossetia, generally considered to be supported by Russia. By 1995, 
Abkhazia and South Ossetia became largely autonomous from 
Georgian central control (8). Shevardnadze normalized otherwise 
tense relations with Russia and matters improved with the breakaway 
regions in Georgia, mostly due to Shevardnadze’s inability to exert 
control over the separatist regions (Davis 2008, 472-473; Lynch 2006, 
20). 
 Georgia’s rose revolution was triggered by contested 
parliamentary elections in November 2003. Shevardnadze was 
perceived to be corrupt and inept in the months leading up to the 
parliamentary elections, and the state was failing in basic sectors 
(Hoe-Yeong 2011, 8; Broers 2005, 334-335). Shevardnadze’s former 
justice minister, Western-educated Mikhail Saakashvili, resigned and 
formed his own party (Hoe-Yeong 2011, 8). Saakashvili’s party was 
popular and poised to win the November 2003 parliamentary elections, 
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but the results returned in favor of Shevardnadze’s party (8). The 
outcome triggered a backlash and accusations of fraud; the mass 
protests and calls for Shevardnadze’s resignation came to be known as 
the rose revolution (8).  
The rose revolution consisted of tens of thousands of protesters 
in the streets, lasted twenty days, and was generally peaceful (Lynch 
2006, 23; Broers 2005, 341). It was the first of the ‘color revolutions’ 
in the region, and it was soon followed by the orange revolution in 
Ukraine and the tulip revolution in the Kyrgyz Republic in subsequent 
years. Shevardnadze resigned, and Saakashvili won the presidential 
election to replace him in January 2004 (Davis 2008, 474).  
Though sometimes fraught with controversy, Georgia’s transition 
reforms following the rose revolution were lauded by the international 
community. Georgia was particularly successful in anti-corruption 
reform, which was reflected in the drastic change in world rankings 
following the rose revolution. For example, Transparency International, 
the world index of perceptions on corruption, ranked Georgia  124th 
place in 2003, and 67th place in 2008 (Kukhianidze 2009). The 
reforms of the post-rose revolution government targeted the resources 
of corrupt officials and a crackdown on criminal enterprises (228). 
One of Saakashvili’s many objectives upon assuming office was 
restoring the territorial integrity of Georgia relative to the separatist 
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regions (Hoe-Yeong 2011, 8). Tensions mounted with Abkhazia and 
South Ossetia, and by 2008 Georgia and Russia were at war over the 
matter. Georgian and Russian accounts of the trigger for war differ on 
key points, but an independent EU inquiry was conducted. Georgia 
intervened militarily in separatist South Ossetia, but Russia also 
intervened militarily on behalf of South Ossetia. Though the EU inquiry 
deemed Georgia responsible for starting the war, it held Russia 
ultimately culpable for its provocative military buildup ahead of the 
conflict (Bowker 2011). The height of military conflict lasted less than 
a week, but the effects and tensions lingered long thereafter.  
Georgia’s tensions with Russia may stem partly from 
Saakashvili’s unapologetic pro-Western policy. Saakashvili avidly 
assumed a pro-NATO stance, much to the chagrin of its Russian 
neighbor. He also pursued close cooperation with the EU, although 
membership prospects always remained in the very distant future. 
Over the years, the EU provided humanitarian assistance to Georgia, 
as well as assistance with infrastructure rehabilitation in the post-
conflict zones (Hoe-Yeong 2011, 13; Lynch 2006, 64; Müller 2011, 
66). Georgia plays a geo-strategic role for Europe as a transit corridor 
for energy traveling from the Caspian across Azerbaijan, Georgia, and 
Turkey to Europe (Hoe-Yeong 2011, 14). 
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 EU policy in Georgia has been based on the Partnership and 
Cooperation Agreement (PCA) of 1999, which created committees 
within the EU to address relations with Georgia in the economic and 
technical spheres primarily, but also some political dialogue toward 
reform and stability (Lynch 2006, 59; Müller 2011, 66). PCAs are a 
series of bilateral EU agreements covering cooperation in various 
sectors such as trade and energy. EU cooperation with Georgia 
deepened in similar sectors following the rose revolution (Müller 2011, 
66).   
 
4.3.2 Context in Ukraine 
As the European Union responded to the important political 
changes taking place in Georgia, Ukraine’s own politics began to 
destabilize as well. The color revolutions were taking hold in the 
region, and it appeared likely that the EU would have to respond to a 
domino effect. Instability in Ukraine, however, was arguably more 
disconcerting for the EU than anywhere else in its periphery. Of the 
non-member post-communist states, Ukraine is likely the most 
important geopolitically (Gawrich et al. 2010; Langbein and Wolczuk 
2012).  
When the Soviet Union collapsed and through the first 
presidential election, Ukraine was led by its Soviet-era leader, Leonid 
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Kravchuk. By 1994, Kravchuk lost the presidency to his former prime 
minister, Leonid Kuchma, who would successfully introduce new and 
broad presidential powers to the constitution (Hesli 2006, 168). Under 
Kuchma, Ukraine was largely deemed by the international community 
to be an authoritarian state. Kuchma won reelection in 1999, but not 
without criticism for his illiberal tactics (169). By the time of the next 
presidential election in 2004, popular sentiment against the 
increasingly unpopular leader would culminate in the orange 
revolution. 
The political upheaval in Ukraine, like the others, began with 
blatant election fraud in a regularly scheduled, yet far from free and 
fair, runoff election. The runoff was between President Kuchma’s 
handpicked candidate and current Prime Minister Viktor Yanukovych, 
and the leading opposition candidate, Viktor Yushchenko, himself a 
former prime minister. Yanukovych leaned toward Russia in foreign 
policy and stood against EU membership aspirations, while Yushchenko 
vowed to look Westward (Hesli 20-6, 170). Despite Yushchenko’s clear 
lead in the polls, Yanukovych won the runoff in an election widely 
deemed by NGOs, IGOs, and citizens to be rigged. Approximately 
200,000 Ukrainians peacefully demonstrated against the fraudulent 
outcome across cities in Ukraine (175). Following the mass protests, 
rerun elections were finally held in December 2004 and finalized in 
95 
 
January, in which Yushchenko was triumphant. Thus, as can be argued 
about the other color revolutions, Ukraine’s orange revolution was an 
electoral revolution—that is, rigged elections successfully contested by 
protesters (Bunce and Wolchik 2006; Kalandadze and Orenstein 
2009).  
The euphoria of the orange revolution quickly dissipated 
domestically, with scandals plaguing the new government, and 
externally, once it became clear that the orange revolution would be 
insufficient to place Ukraine on the path to EU membership (Kubicek 
2009, 324). The EU remained conspicuously mum about Ukrainian 
membership as well (337). 
In the EU, the debate surrounding how to respond to the orange 
revolution quickly became couched in terms of enlargement, 
particularly because Ukrainian leaders emphasized accession as a 
priority. The notion of Ukrainian enlargement existed in the context of 
the recent “big bang” of ten new members the year before, including 
eight former Soviet satellites. In addition to the big bang, the 
accession of Bulgaria and Romania was imminent, while talks of 
Turkey and several other Balkan states like Croatia and Serbia were 
looming in the background. The disagreement at the EU level was 
indicative of strong popular cleavages brewing below.  
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Regarding Ukraine, the divide manifested most starkly between 
two groups. On one side were members who were more supportive of 
Ukraine during this time; they included the new member-states plus 
Britain and sometimes Germany. On the other side were members who 
were much less amenable, including the western and southern major 
European states, like France. Poland and Lithuania led efforts to 
resolve the political crisis in Ukraine despite lacking official EU 
representation (Kuzio 2006, 95). Indeed, records from the Lithuanian 
foreign ministry show a commitment to Ukrainian integration as an 
institutional advocate and active partner before and especially after 
the orange revolution (Lithuania MFA 2004). Polish, along with German 
and Lithuanian, efforts to expand ties with Ukraine beyond existing 
frameworks encountered staunch resistance from members who 
opposed expanding cooperation frameworks and unequivocally 
opposed extending the possibility of membership (Stoltyk 2005).  
The role of Russia figured prominently in the response to the 
orange revolution. Qualitative survey data from the Institute for 
European Politics, a German-based nonprofit organization dedicated to 
the study of European integration, reveals significant variance in how 
member-states of the EU viewed relations with Russia in the months 
preceding the orange revolution. Not surprisingly, the newest EU 
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members across Central Eastern Europe were the most critical of 
relations with Russia (IEP 2004).   
 EU-Ukrainian relations extend back to the early 1990s, when the 
EU was cultivating ties with most of the post-Soviet satellites and 
republics shortly after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Like Georgia, 
Ukraine was never part of the Central and Eastern European bloc—
which ranges from Estonia to Hungary—to participate in various major 
financial aid programs for infrastructure and development (Solonenko 
2009, 713). Instead, it was grouped separately as part of the Newly 
Independent States—a category that included Russia and the Central 
Asian republics. Whereas eventual EU membership seemed promising 
for the Central and Eastern European bloc, the same did not hold for 
Ukraine (713). Unlike the experiences of the Central and Eastern 
European countries, EU conditionality in Ukraine was weak, monitoring 
was lax, and benchmarks were vague (717). 
 The first major agreement between the EU and Ukraine, the 
Partnership and Cooperation Agreement, was signed in 1994 and went 
into effect after EU member-state ratification in 1998. The next major 
milestone for EU-Ukraine relations was the European Neighborhood 
Policy (ENP), which was an overarching framework for EU relations 
with its neighbors in Eastern Europe and the Middle East North Africa 
region. The ENP comprises a set of bilateral agreements known as 
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Action Plans (AP). In these ways, the EU anticipated and acknowledged 
the new borders it would inherit following the accession of the former 
Soviet satellite states.  
The tenets of the ENP regarding Ukraine were negotiated under 
outgoing President Leonid Kuchma, widely regarded as complicit in the 
corrupt and fraudulent runoff elections that would trigger the orange 
revolution in 2005. The ENP was devised before any of the political 
upheaval occurred. It was designed to address the post-enlargement 
landscape, not to respond to democratization efforts central to the 
color revolutions (Kuzio 2006, 90).  Although the ENP had been a post-
enlargement response to Kuchma’s Ukraine, the ENP, in virtually the 
same form, became the response to the orange revolution. In other 
words, there was no strategically unique EU response to the dramatic 
political turn of events; the EU response to the orange revolution was 
essentially a failure to revamp existing policies in light of the 
revolutions and to table the highly controversial issues which it 
deliberately avoided in the ENP. The most notable among them was 
the conspicuous absence of the possibility for membership. Ukraine 
(and Georgia, for that matter) made no secret of its desire to join the 
EU, and it has expressed interest in joining the EU off-and-on 
throughout the years (Langbein and Wolczuk 2012, 868).  
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The EU did make minor concessions in other sectors. The EU as 
an institution was the top donor in aid to Ukraine the year following 
the revolution (AidFlows, 2011). The EU granted Ukraine market-
economy status within a year of the revolution, a move that paved the 
way for Ukrainian accession to the World Trade Organization and for 
upgraded economic ties between the two. It also eased visa 
restrictions, something it did not do with Georgia, for example 
(Larrabee 2006, 97; Tocci 2006, 77).  
Besides extensive aid in the technical, nuclear safety, and 
humanitarian sectors throughout the 1990s and 2000s (Kubicek 2005, 
277-278), the EU had limited physical presence in Ukraine. Shortly 
after the orange revolution, the EU established a delegation of advisors 
on border security in late 2005. The group, known as the EU Border 
Assistance Mission to Ukraine and Moldova, sought to mitigate 
smuggling and trafficking, and to facilitate the orderly transfer of 
goods, people, and trade through capacity-building, especially at a 
time when the EU’s own borders expanded eastward after the 2004-
2007 big bang (Dura 2009, 276; Kurowska and Tallis 2009, 53). The 
Border Mission was managed by the European Commission with 
intermittent input from member-states (Dura 2009, 278-279). The 
Mission conducts its work—primarily technical in nature—by providing 
training, limited oversight, and risk analysis along the Ukrainian-
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Moldovan border, particularly in the conflicted Transnistrian region. 
(280). EU program officials claim credit for facilitating a new customs 
regime in the area, and contributing to major operations against illicit 
border activities (282-283), though the extent of the local benefit is 
debatable due to difficulties in measuring such successes (Kurowska 
and Tallis 2009, 56-59). 
 
4.3.3 Context in the Kyrgyz Republic 
 Like Georgia and Ukraine, the Kyrgyz Republic was a Soviet 
Socialist Republic since the interwar period. Since the independence of 
Kyrgyzstan and the collapse of the Soviet Union, it has been 
considered exceptional in the region, as it is the only republic in 
Central Asia to experience periods of competitive politics and 
liberalization (Hiro 2009, 289; Huskey and Hill 2011, 876), and the 
only republic in the region to undergo a ‘color revolution’. 
 Kyrgyzstan’s first president, Askar Akayev, assumed the 
leadership role shortly before independence in 1990, and then was 
popularly reelected after independence in 1991, 1995, and 2000. 
Akayev was perceived to be a pro-democracy reformer, but by 2000 to 
2005, he was accused of rampant corruption and clientelism (Aydıngün 
and Aydıngün 2012, 2). After the 2005 parliamentary elections, the 
people of Kyrgyzstan revolted in mass protest in what came to be 
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known as the tulip revolution. Akayev was ousted, and Kurmanbek 
Bakiyev took his place.   
Bakiyev, who promised to deliver the democratic reforms 
championed by the tulip revolution, was president from 2005 to 2010. 
He not only failed to deliver on his promises, but instead moved 
toward authoritarianism quickly upon assuming office, which only 
added to the continued rampant corruption and clientelism (Aydıngün 
and Aydıngün 2012, 2; Collins 2011, 153). Basic freedoms worsened 
under Bakiyev relative to his predecessor (Collins 2011, 153). As 
protests and clashes filled the streets, Bakiyev, too, was popularly 
ousted in 2010. His place was assumed by Rosa Otunbayeva, who was 
a pro-Western supporter of democratization and an active participant 
of the tulip revolution (154), as interim president until December 
2011. She oversaw a transition to free and fair elections, but also 
oversaw major ethnic violence. One of the significant reforms of this 
interim period was Kyrgyzstan’s shift from a presidential system to 
parliamentary system, the first of its kind in the region. 
 Due in large part to Soviet ethnic engineering policies and 
Soviet-era migration patterns, Kyrgyzstan is a multi-ethnic society. 
Kyrgyzstan has a history of ethnic tension and violence, notably 1990 
and 2010. The clashes were waged between ethnic Kyrgyz and ethnic 
Uzbeks, primarily in the south of the country but also in the capital 
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along the north. The clashes in 1990 happened during the Gorbachev 
reforms, and they began as protests over land reform (Aydıngün and 
Aydıngün 2012, 12). The clashes of 2010 occurred shortly after 
Bakiyev fled the country and while Otunbayeva led the transition. The 
son of ousted leader Bakiyev was accused of stirring ethnic mistrust 
and instigating the 2010 violence amid a bleak economic atmosphere 
(13). 
 Until the post-9/11 era, EU relations with Kyrgyzstan were 
limited to economic and energy ties, but the focus on Afghanistan and 
the Middle East renewed attention to Central Asia as a strategic region 
(Hoffman 2010, 94). Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan would become 
logistical hubs for the war in Afghanistan. Kyrgyzstan’s civilian airport 
in the country’s capital served as the US military base and transit hub 
for personnel bound to Afghanistan. Furthermore, Central Asia gained 
strategic relevance as an alternative source of gas for Europe, 
especially following energy shortages in 2009 (95). EU security 
concerns in the region translated into EU-sponsored training and 
material support for counternarcotic and counterterrorism programs 
(Hoffman 2010, 100; Yazdani 2008, 251). 
EU physical presence in Kyrgyzstan has been very limited as 
well. The Council sent a Brussels-based Special Representative to the 
Central Asian region, a position it established in July 2005. The 
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primary mission was to promote good relations with the region. The 
Commission has a Central Asia delegation based in Kazakhstan, with a 
small local office in Kyrgyzstan. The Commission also ramped up 
human rights dialogue in the region in 2007 by establishing annual 
meetings between Commission and Central Asian counterparts 
regarding bilateral human rights and civil society. 
 
4.4 Conclusion 
 
Democratic discourse in this research must be understood 
relative to its environment. The texts examined in this research 
become constitutive of these larger events surrounding them 
(Blommaert 2005, 39).  
 This chapter described the context of the EU relative to the 
international community as one dominated by large-scale conflict, such 
as the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, and relations with resurgent 
world powers, like Russia. It also described the internal context of the 
EU itself as one plagued by a “big bang” hangover, institutional 
reforms, and member-state divisions. The three case studies—Georgia, 
Ukraine, and Kyrgyzstan—were all former Soviet republics 
experiencing color revolutions, in which mass protests successfully 
challenged fraudulent elections. 
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 Each context is replete with asymmetric power relations:  the EU 
as a normative power relative to members of the international 
community as militarized powers, including its own members; within 
the EU, larger and economically more robust states who have been 
members for longer relative to smaller, weaker, and newer member-
states; and the EU relative to the non-member post-Soviet states in 
question. Also, power asymmetries exist across the institutions of 
focus, whereby one may have greater authority in foreign affairs than 
another. These power asymmetries affect discourse when they restrict 
or loosen the bounds of official textual discourse. For democratic 
discourse, such power structures affect the hypothesized negative 
relationship between institutional authority abroad and the level of 
democratic discourse used. 
This research does not measure the impact or effectiveness of 
EU action or inaction in the target states, but the context does 
illustrate the limited presence of the EU despite the dramatic political 
changes occurring throughout the years under study. 
 The contexts of the three case studies in particular demonstrate 
that Georgia, Ukraine, and the Kyrgyz Republic each are, for their own 
reasons, of crucial importance to the EU. As such, one would expect a 
well-defined, mature, and coherent foreign policy approach, reflective 
of EU interests, to be a precondition for favorable future prospects of 
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the EU. Because these interests are not always consistent across the 
different institutions, this research will show that opinions on what 
precisely constitutes EU interests vary among the Commission, the 
Council, and the Parliament, which define foreign policy objectives 
differently.   
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Chapter 5: Constructing Democracy through Discourse 
 
 This chapter explores the data collected, coded, and analyzed 
using Atlas.ti software. The chapter is divided into five parts. The first 
three of the five parts present the data by EU institution (the unit of 
analysis), starting with the Commission first, followed by the Council 
and then the Parliament. Each institution will begin with the 
institution’s role in the international affairs of the EU (see Figure 2), 
followed by a description of the data and the discursive findings. These 
sections are subdivided by case studies, and they identify patterns of 
democratic discourse regarding Georgia, Ukraine, and the Kyrgyz 
Republic. The data is presented in that order based on the sequence in 
which the color revolutions unfolded—first Georgia, then Ukraine, and 
finally the Kyrgyz Republic. The fourth section of this chapter 
summarizes the findings by case study, and the fifth section concludes 
the chapter. 
The data in this chapter will demonstrate that the three 
institutions of the EU under study demonstrate distinct patterns of 
democratic discourse. The Commission focuses on rule of law, 
elections, and basic rights and freedoms. It is also most prone to react 
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to political crises in the case studies. The Council focuses heavily on 
critical elections as benchmarks of democracy; otherwise it tends 
toward intangible qualities and democratic norms and ideals. The 
Council has the most basic definition of democracy, most like that of 
scholar Joseph Schumpeter (1942).  
  
 
 
Figure 2: Roles of Institutions 
 
•Supranational, represents the interests of the 
EU as a whole 
•EU's international representative; negotiates 
international agreements (except for limited 
policy areas of CFSP, which remains 
intergovernmental) 
•One Commissioner per member-state appointed 
for five years 
•Only institution that can propose draft 
legislation, which then goes to the Council and 
Parliament 
Commission 
(The 
Representative) 
N=100 
•Intergovernmental, represents the interests of 
the member-state 
•Decision-makers, makes  EU foreign policy 
based on proposals by the Commission and in 
consultation with the Parliament in policy 
outside of CFSP 
•For CFSP matters, retains primary authority 
•Each member-state sends its foreign minister to 
meetings on foreign affairs 
•Appoints the High Representative for Foreign 
Affairs and Security Policy, who chairs the 
Foreign Affairs Council and leads CFSP 
Council of 
Ministers 
(The Decision-
Maker)  
N=82 
•Subnational, represents the interests of the 
citizens 
•Must consent to legislation, approve Commission 
appointments, and is the only body that can 
dismiss the Commission 
•Ministers popularly elected for five years 
Parliament 
(The Consultant) 
N=48 
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Finally, the Parliament is most critical of decisions made in the 
countries and of fellow EU institutions. It constructs democracy in 
holistic terms, meaning elements like elections and rule of law are 
pieces of a larger conceptualization of democracy. Thus the Parliament 
has the most comprehensive view of democracy, like that of scholars 
Diamond and Morlino (2004) and Coppedge et al. (2011), whereby 
democracy is a complex amalgamation of procedural and substantive 
qualities. The Parliament’s construction of democracy is also a 
reflection of its character as the only democratically elected institution 
of the EU. 
 
5.1 Discourse by the Commission 
 
 As the most supranational of EU institutions, it is the mandate of 
the Commission to uphold the interests of the EU as a collective entity. 
In foreign matters outside the scope of the Common Foreign and 
Security Policy (CFSP), it has the authority to negotiate international 
agreements on behalf of the EU, which are subsequently finalized by 
the Council. Examples of policy areas outside the CFSP in which the 
Commission is lead negotiator include humanitarian aid, trade, 
development assistance, new member accession, and neighborhood 
policy. The Commission exercises this authority through its 
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directorate-generals (DG), or departments. The DGs most associated 
with external affairs are the Directorate General for External Relations 
and European Neighborhood Policy until 2009, and the DGs for trade, 
humanitarian and foreign aid, development, and enlargement (Mix 
2011, 17). The Commission is not lead negotiator for the limited policy 
areas that fall under the CFSP—such as military missions, major 
sanctions like those against Iran, weapons of mass destruction, and 
the arms trade—which remain under the purview of state interests and 
thus reside with the Council. 
 Because the Commission is like the EU foreign representative, 
developments in the color revolutions were particularly salient and 
relevant to this institution. The color revolutions were not part of the 
CFSP, meaning the Commission had the greatest role relative to its 
sister institutions in such matters. It responded to the dramatic 
political events of Georgia, Ukraine, and the Kyrgyz Republic via 
official means collected as data in this research. The 100 pieces of 
data for the Commission that address democracy explicitly in the 
context of the case studies include Action Fiches (financing proposals 
designed to facilitate decision-making), external memoranda, 
institutional press releases, official speeches, meeting minutes, and 
institutional reports, all of which were made public and released as 
official institutional discourse. Of the Commission data, almost half of 
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the data dealt with Ukraine, followed by Georgia and then the Kyrgyz 
Republic. [See Figure 3]  
 
 
Figure 3: Commission Data Linking Democracy and Case Study 
 
 
5.1.1 Commission Discourse on Georgia 
 The Commission data for Georgia included 34 documents which 
addressed democracy explicitly. The data revealed an emphasis on 
rule of law, institution building, and elections for the time period 
between 2003 and 2011. Throughout those years, the rate of 
democratic discourse—that is, the frequency with which the 
Commission explicitly linked the term democracy with the case of 
Georgia—spiked in 2008 most notably, followed by 2010 and 2004. 
[See Figure 4] 
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Figure 4: Commission Data on Georgia 
 
 The spike in democratic discourse by the Commission regarding 
Georgia has to do in great part with the volatile political context of that 
year. The year 2008 began with the aftermath of mass demonstrations 
held by the public in November 2007, in which citizens rallied against 
perceived corruption in the Saakashvili administration, culminating in a 
state-of-emergency declared by the government (Tatum 2009, 153). 
The protests were the largest since the rose revolution four years 
earlier. In response, President Saakashvili held early presidential 
elections, and, in January 2008, he was reelected by voters. In May of 
that year, Georgia held early parliamentary elections as well. Finally, 
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the brief war with Russia over secessionist Abkhazia and South Ossetia 
peaked in August 2008, though tensions were brewing in the months 
leading to that time. By September 2008, the economic effects of 
conflict with Russia became evident—growth contracted significantly 
from 12.7% the year before to 2.3% in 2008 (Müller 2011, 70). 
The data also demonstrated a spike in democratic discourse in 
2004, a crucial year for Georgia, since it immediately followed the rose 
revolution of late 2003. Discourse by the Commission reflects the 
cautious optimism of its day. One press release regarding President 
Saakashvili’s first official visit to the Commission that year following 
the rose revolution emphasized rule of law (COM 2004/997): “We have 
confidence that President Saakashvili will show the political will to lead 
the courageous Georgian people towards a bright and solid democratic 
future, in which the rule of law and a free market economy replace 
organized crime and corruption.”  
The context in Georgia during the spike in 2010 was the passing 
of major amendments to the constitution by the Georgian Parliament. 
The constitutional changes diminished executive powers in favor of 
parliamentary ones, and set Georgia on the path toward greater 
parliamentary rule (Welt 2010). The reforms were controversial, 
however, as opponents skeptically claimed ulterior motives by 
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President Saakashvili, whom they viewed as posturing himself for the 
role of prime minister after his presidency (Welt 2010). 
In the case of Georgia, the Commission’s emphasis on rule of 
law, institution building, and quality of elections—seemingly directed at 
preserving order in a fragile democracy—were evident throughout the 
time period under examination. Often, democracy was framed in terms 
of paradoxical rules: the rules attempted to limit the government’s 
power when it transcended certain undefined norms, but they also 
expected the government to preserve order when confronted with 
major challenges. For Georgia, it meant that the Commission expected 
a balance between order and repression for the sake of stability. This 
delicate balance was especially obvious in the late 2007 protests; the 
protestors’ grievances against corruption; the subsequent government 
crackdown; and the consequent early elections. This was a series of 
events over the course of less than one year that challenged Georgia 
to preserve order without gross violations of human rights.  
In reference to the protests, an internal memo made the 
following note (COM 2008/821): “Public administration reform is still at 
an early stage. The lack of institutional stability and the continuous 
changes and restructuring within the public administration are putting 
at risks the sustainability of reforms and impact negatively on the 
overall governance.” In this case, institutional capacity was an 
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important precursor to good governance. Institutions as rules, 
particularly democratic institutions, were highlighted by the 
Commission. That year, they recognized basic democratic institutions 
were in place, “but further efforts need to be made to ensure that a 
democratic and human rights culture takes root in Georgian society” 
(COM 2008/817). 
 Rule of law was a common theme that became pronounced 
during and after the protests. Flagrant corruption was leading to mass 
protests. This concern was echoed by the Commission, which praised 
any small gain by Georgia in justice and against corruption: “Progress 
has been achieved in justice sector reform, improving the business 
climate and the fight against corruption” (COM 2011/915). The 
Commission made the connection between rule of law and good 
governance in a 2008 Action Fiche focusing on criminal justice reform, 
in which it stated that  “good governance”  was necessary so that 
Georgia may “comply with its international and national legal 
obligations in the field of human rights” (COM 2008/816). In turn, the 
document asserted, institutions would strengthen “in line with 
democratic standards, which is the precondition for stability and 
security in the country” (COM 2008/816).  
For the Commission, elections in Georgia needed to be free and 
fair. The motif was evident during elections years, especially in 2004 
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(the first post-revolution presidential election). Several Commission 
documents depict the emphasis on elections. In an Action Fiche from 
2011, the Commission referred to a 2010 round of local elections, 
calling it “an important test for the maturity of the functioning of 
democratic institutions in the country” (COM 2011/959). It made a 
similar reference in 2005 regarding the importance of “local self-
government” (COM 2004/997). 
Several patterns in the discourse suggest the Commission’s 
Western notion of proper elections. For one, the media would have to 
play a role in the proper conduct of elections. The Commission called 
the media a “fundamental freedom” in 2008 (COM 2008/1095) and 
considered it critical for democratic consolidation (COM 2010/1102, 
COM 2010/1222). In one press release in anticipation of the May 21, 
2008, parliamentary elections, the Commission stated that, “The 
successful organization of these elections will contribute to 
strengthening the development of a democratic political system in 
Georgia” (COM 2008/1051).  
The piece of data that perhaps best sums up the Commission’s 
perspective of democracy in Georgia is a 2011 strategic document that 
took into account the tumultuous events of the preceding years. The 
Commission described democracy in Georgia as having made 
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significant gains toward democracy, but with noted need for 
improvement in some areas (COM 2011/915, 5-6, 9): 
 Corruption: “Progress has been achieved in justice 
sector reform, improving the business climate and the 
fight against corruption.” 
 Political divisions: “In mid-2007, Georgia entered a 
period of political turmoil, marked by anti-government 
mass demonstrations and a polarized atmosphere 
between the ruling majority and opposition parties.” And 
“In April 2009, the political opposition in Georgia started 
mass demonstrations, demanding the resignation of 
President Saakashvili. This development, and the 
criticisms made by the opposition parties, prompted the 
Georgian government to push forward even further with 
continuing democratic reforms, encouraging political 
pluralism, amending the election code and ensuring 
media freedom.” 
 Elections: “Early presidential and legislative elections in 
2008 […] were reported to be in line with international 
standards, by the OSCE/OIDHR, though the reports 
outlined several irregularities in the conduct of both 
elections. The opposition parties also criticized the ruling 
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majority regarding the conduct of elections and 
contested the validity of the results. This resulted in the 
decision of some opposition parties not to take up their 
seats in Parliament.” 
 Civil Society: “To be able to consolidate the reforms and 
assistance provided on good governance and in the 
development of a modern state, oriented towards the 
needs of its citizens, support for civil service reforms 
requires special attention… for strengthening democratic 
institutions and enhancing political pluralism, support for 
human rights and media freedom should be further 
encouraged. This point is supported by highlighting the 
need for civil society development, encouraging the 
systemic involvement of CSOs at all stages of 
programming and implementation.” 
 
The same 2011 document set forth “democratic development, 
rule of law, good governance” as the Commission’s first priority in 
Georgia. The related sub-priorities were (COM 2011/915): (1) media 
freedom, political pluralism, human rights, civil society development; 
(2) justice sector reform; and (3) public finance management and 
public administration reform. The Commission claimed that these 
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would lead to “greater acceptance of democratic values and lasting 
results in democratization” and a “modern state oriented towards the 
needs of its citizens and increased public confidence in the justice 
system.” 
 Considering the peak of democratic discourse in 2008, one event 
in Georgia was conspicuously missing in the Commission data: the 
Commission devoted minimal attention to Georgia’s conflict with 
Russia, which peaked that year. One compelling reason for this is that 
the war itself falls within the scope of the CFSP, and thus resides with 
the Council of the EU due to the military and security implications of 
the issue. Still, in the 100-piece data linking democratic discourse by 
the Commission to Georgia, the Commission only addressed the 
conflict in terms of the stability and territorial integrity of Georgia and 
the refusal to recognize the independence of the breakaway regions of 
Abkhazia and South Ossetia. The conflict was not framed in terms of 
sovereignty from Russia, and the Commission only referred to the 
conflict as a domestic issue relative to the separatist regions. This 
perspective of the conflict was evident in two documents out of 100 
(COM 2008/821, COM 2011/1235).  
 
 Overall, the democratic discourse by the Commission in Georgia 
focused on rule of law, institution building, and elections. The 
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Commission responded to major crises, valued stability and effective 
institutions, and anticipated election cycles in Georgia. These elements 
came together in late 2007 to 2008, when the Commission engaged in 
democratic discourse the most. 
 
5.1.2 Commission Discourse on Ukraine 
Of the three case studies, Commission discourse was 
consistently most fertile regarding to Ukraine. The database for this 
study includes a set of 48 Commission documents in which democracy 
and Ukraine are coded concurrently. Ukraine’s political transition may 
have had a more immediate impact on the EU’s geopolitical and 
strategic interests than that of the other case studies. Geopolitically, 
Ukraine sits between Russia and Europe. The accession of the former 
Soviet satellites would be of added significance to the geopolitical 
dimension, as Ukraine’s orientation and policy preference for East 
versus West became more pronounced. Issues such as rule of law and 
procedural democracy would therefore have direct impact on the EU. 
The Commission’s discourse in the case of Ukraine emphasized 
elections, rule of law, and basic rights for the years of the study. 
Throughout the years, the rate of democratic discourse spiked in 2010 
and 2011 most notably. Figure 5 illustrates the frequency of 
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Commission documents which explicitly referenced democracy in the 
context of Ukraine in the dataset.   
 
 
 
Figure 5: Commission Data on Ukraine 
 
The spike in democratic discourse reflects major political 
setbacks in Ukraine during 2010 to 2011.  Viktor Yanukovych, the 
same candidate who was deemed to have rigged the 2004 elections 
that sparked the orange revolution—won the presidency in a bitter 
election against then-Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko. It is also the 
same year in which Yanukovych, after his victory, commenced criminal 
proceedings against Tymoshenko; she was sentenced in 2011 to seven 
years in prison for ostensible abuse of office.  
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The data reveals a deep concern for political developments in 
Ukraine following the 2010 victory of President Yanukovych and the 
subsequent criminal case against Ms. Tymoshenko. Though the 2010 
elections were generally described in satisfactory terms, almost all the 
data for those years emphasize rule of law and human rights. In 2010, 
shortly after Yanukovych assumed the presidency, the Commission 
pointed out that it was “concerned at consistent and wide-spread 
reports of deterioration in respect to fundamental freedoms and 
democratic principles in Ukraine. Particularly worrying are complaints 
related to freedom of the media, freedom of assembly and freedom of 
association” (COM 2010/1227). 
In one instance, the Commission was very direct about the 
Tymoshenko case, asserting that “the procedural flaws in the on-going 
trials of opposition representatives were symptomatic of politically-
motivated justice and acted to undermine democracy and the core 
European values” (COM 2011/1119). Indeed, as with the other cases, 
democratic values were often tied to the benchmark of European 
standards (COM 2011/972): “increased knowledge of EU standards 
and practices will raise democratic standards.”   
The ENP Indicative for Ukraine, released in 2011, illustrates the 
Commission’s concerns over Yanukovych in the larger context (COM 
2011/916): 
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Since the Orange Revolution of 2004, Ukraine has made 
significant progress in deepening respect for democratic norms 
and human rights: successive national elections have been 
conducted largely in accordance with international standards; 
civil society has taken root and flourished particularly in the 
larger cities; there is a large degree of pluralism in the media 
due partly to pluralism in media ownership. At the same time 
the major political forces in Ukraine (including both the former 
Orange Coalition leaders and the main opposition party) have 
confirmed Ukraine’s European aspirations and its commitment to 
a reform agenda. Nonetheless, reform efforts in particular as 
regards implementation of laws and other normative acts have 
been significantly undermined by political instability. Political 
divisions within Ukraine’s leadership have in turn been 
exacerbated by constitutional arrangements which lack clarity as 
regards the division of powers and responsibilities. Consequently 
in the past two years the pace of reform has slowed and at 
certain significant periods of time some of the major institutions 
of state have been virtually paralyzed […] Key reform priorities 
remain: reform of the constitution itself; strengthening of 
respect for the rule of law (notably through judicial reform), 
redoubling of efforts to combat corruption and strengthening of 
the business and investment climate. Ukraine’s leadership has 
repeatedly confirmed the importance of continuing reform in all 
123 
 
of these areas and consequently these priorities are reflected in 
the new EU-Ukraine Association Agenda. 
 
 The document acknowledges gains made in previous years, but 
admonishes strife among political leaders, and diminished progress 
toward reform and rule of law. 
 Another notable element of discourse was the question of future 
EU membership. Democratic discourse in Ukraine was coupled with the 
(un)likelihood of membership. The EU Commission made a concerted 
effort to preclude membership, albeit without completely eliminating 
the possibility of future membership. The sentiment was persistent 
throughout the years. In 2004, it stated that, though “membership is 
not on the agenda”, the EU was “not closing any doors” (COM 
2004/1201). In a 2005 speech, the Commissioner for External 
Relations and the ENP stated (COM 2005/1202): “Ukraine has a great 
deal of work to do to consolidate its democratic and economic 
transitions, both of which are necessary before EU membership 
becomes an option.” In minutes from a 2011 meeting, the Commission 
made the link between democracy and membership again (COM 
2011/777): “the importance of the EU having a clear position in its 
relations with Ukraine taking account, on the one hand, of the need to 
make the signature of the association agreement conditional on 
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Ukraine’s respect for the principles of democracy and rule of law and, 
on the other hand, of the support to be given to the country in order 
to confirm and crystallize it’s rapprochement with the EU.” 
 The EU’s efforts to couple democratic progress with the 
prospects of membership are closely tied to EU precedent in the new 
member states of Central and Eastern Europe. In that case, the EU 
was using soft conditionality, in which the (credible) commitment and 
prospect of membership was the carrot and the threat of delayed or 
terminated accession negotiations was the stick. However, in regions 
further east like Ukraine where the distant prospect of membership 
was not compelling or sufficiently credible, EU’s efforts to link 
democratic progress to future membership have minimal practical 
effects and remain in the discursive realm. 
  
 Overall, the democratic discourse by the Commission in Ukraine 
emphasized elections, rule of law, and basic rights. The latter had to 
do with the Commission’s critical response to the politics of 
Yanukovych following his presidential victory in 2010 and subsequent 
criminal case against political rival Tymoshenko. In the case of 
Ukraine, the Commission also linked progress in democratic reform to 
the prospects of future membership, a policy area in which the 
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Commission is the primary driver. This linkage suggests weak 
conditionality, or leverage, between the Commission and Ukraine. 
 
5.1.3 Commission Discourse on the Kyrgyz Republic  
 Of the three case studies, discourse was least frequent in the 
case of Kyrgyzstan. The database for this study includes a set of 21 
Commission documents in which democracy and Kyrgyzstan were 
coded simultaneously. The discourse emphasized very basic 
democratic values and fundamental freedoms, especially as they 
related to pluralism typical of democratic societies. The Commission 
dedicated most of its limited democratic discourse to the years 2009 
and 2010, which reflected a spike in the data. Figure 6 illustrates the 
frequency of data which explicitly referenced democracy in the context 
of Kyrgyzstan in the dataset. 
The spread of data in the figure above is very telling about which 
political developments were of significance to the Commission. For 
years, Kyrgyzstan was under the Soviet-era leadership of President 
Askar Akayev until the 2005 tulip revolution promised to bring about 
democracy. From 2005 to 2010, the promises were never fulfilled by 
Kyrgyzstan’s new President Kurmanbek Bakiyev. The Commission 
made conspicuously little mention of the tulip revolution years until 
Bakiyev’s suspect re-election in 2009. These years were crucial for the 
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region, because Kyrgyzstan was the first and, since then, the only 
country to popularly reject its Soviet-era president in 2005 in the 
name of democratic revolution. Despite the historical importance of 
those years, the dataset included only four Commission documents 
from 2005 to 2008 with democratic discourse. 
 
 
Figure 6: Commission Data on Kyrgyzstan 
 
 
 It was not until 2009 and 2010 that the Commission paid notice. 
In 2009, Bakiyev won re-election in presidential elections highly 
criticized by onlookers. The elections were amid increasingly severe 
antidemocratic moves by Bakiyev. In 2010 Kyrgyzstanis staged 
another popular revolution, and Bakiyev was toppled by mass protests 
in April. In a bid to limit the broad powers once enjoyed by Bakiyev 
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under a presidential system, reformers established Kyrgyzstan as 
Central Asia’s first and only parliamentary democracy. Thus the 
Commission’s spread of data demonstrates that the promises of 
democracy from the tulip revolution did not garner significant 
democratic discourse until Bakiyev’s bold moves in 2009 and the new 
revolution in 2010.  
Though the 2009 re-election of Bakiyev was widely condemned 
by the international community as unfair, the Commission did not 
discuss the procedural elements of elections in the dataset for that 
year. There were no references to the flawed re-election methods of 
Bakiyev. Instead, the Commission looked toward freedoms of speech, 
as they related to the media and civil society. The Commission called 
the media a “‘watchdog’ for democracy and good governance” (COM 
2009/872), and noted that civil society groups had “publicly 
complained about a shrinking of democratic space that has weakened 
their ability to make the different government levels accountable of 
their actions” (COM 2009/870; COM 2009/875).  
Finally, in 2010, the Commission made more direct commentary 
on the state of democracy in the country, shortly before the fall of 
Bakiyev. A 2010 Action Fiche sounded alarm over “a risk of a 
worsening of the situation and a backtrack towards less democratic 
environments” (COM 2010/941; COM 2010/942). The Commission 
128 
 
responded to the 2010 revolution in the following memo (COM 
2010/948): “The Provisional Government announced its resolve to 
return the country to democratic principles and prepared, with the 
support of the international community, including the EU and the 
Venice Commission of the Council of Europe, a new Constitution which 
should create the region's first parliamentary democracy.”  
In addition to the gaps in discourse regarding the initial 
democratic promises of the tulip revolution, the Commission also did 
not address the widespread and deadly violent conflict that erupted 
across the country in May 2010 (just one month after the new 
revolution) in any of the democratic discourse data. Democratic 
discourse would have been very relevant, considering the severity of 
the conflict—the interim leader declared a state of emergency amid the 
violent and gruesome deaths of hundreds of victims, as well as the 
displacement of many more. The basic security capabilities of the state 
were under question, and other international observers placed blame 
on the authorities themselves in perpetuating the violence against 
ethnic minorities.  
 
Overall, the democratic discourse by the Commission in 
Kyrgyzstan emphasized basic democratic values and fundamental 
freedoms considered typical of functioning democratic societies. The 
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Commission devoted most of its democratic discourse to the severe 
restrictions on freedoms of speech in the late Bakiyev years, shortly 
before the new revolution of 2010. With the new revolution, the 
Commission emphasized basic values, such as respect for human 
rights and civil society. Conspicuously absent from democratic 
discourse were the early democratic promises of the 2005 tulip 
revolution and the deadly ethnic conflict of 2010. 
 
5.2 Discourse by the Council 
 
 As the most intergovernmental of the EU institutions, it is the 
Council’s job to uphold member-state interests. It is responsible for 
consulting the Parliament and concluding foreign policy initiated by the 
Commission. The Council achieves this by convening monthly the 
Ministers of Foreign Affairs from each member-state. Before 2009, 
these meetings were called the General Affairs and External Relations 
Council; after 2009, it became the Foreign Affairs Council. As of 2009, 
the latter meeting is chaired by the High Representative of the Union 
for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, who is then responsible for 
coordinating policy among member-state interests and for 
spearheading the Common Foreign and Security Policy, when 
applicable in sensitive policy sectors of military and security. 
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 The dataset for the Council included 82 documents that address 
democracy explicitly for the case studies. The documents are press 
releases, meeting minutes, and official speeches and statements. More 
than half of the data dealt with Ukraine, followed by Georgia, and 
significantly less for Kyrgyzstan (see Figure 7). The data on the 
Council revealed an emphasis on critical elections, but also norms and 
ideals, rather than concrete institutions or reforms. 
 
 
Figure 7: Council Data Linking Democracy and Case Study 
 
 
5.2.1 Council Discourse on Georgia 
The Council data on Georgia included 27 documents which 
addressed democracy explicitly in the context of Georgia. The data 
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emphasized elections especially and stability. The only spike in data 
was in 2004, which was the time period immediately following the rose 
revolution.  
 
 
 
Figure 8: Council Data on Georgia 
 
 
For the Council, the conduct of elections was paramount, and the 
secondary emphasis on stability was closely intertwined with elections. 
Major elections were held in Georgia in 2003 (parliamentary, the 
results of which were annulled during the rose revolution), 2004 
(parliamentary and presidential), and 2008 (parliamentary and 
presidential); local elections were held in 2006 (the first local elections 
after the rose revolution) and 2010.  
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As early as the 2003 elections, the Council “emphasized the 
importance of stability in Georgia and in the region and urged all 
parties concerned to respect the rule of law and to resort only to 
peaceful and democratic means in seeking to resolve political 
differences” (Council 2003/1287), but shortly afterward issued a 
statement regarding election irregularities (Council 2003/2674): “The 
European Union regrets these developments which weaken the trust of 
the Georgian people in the authorities and are in contrast to the 
evolution towards a democratic civil society.” 
The rose revolution was a turning point for how the Council 
perceived elections in Georgia. Following the dramatic political changes 
of late 2003 and early 2004, the Council made several positive 
comments regarding the 2004 elections, including: “closer to meeting 
international standards for democratic elections” (Council 2004/2679); 
“commendable progress...closer to meeting OSCE and Council of 
Europe standards for democratic elections” (Council 2004/2683); and 
“…the elections demonstrated commendable progress compared with 
previous elections…” (Council 2004/2683). 
The Council issued a press release regarding the 2008 
presidential elections, which were held early in response to 2007 
protests, stating (Council 2008/1444): “The Presidential Elections on 5 
January 2008 were an important test for democracy and stability in 
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Georgia […] consistent with most OSCE and Council of Europe 
commitments and standards for democratic elections.” Regarding the 
2008 parliamentary elections, also held early for the same reason, the 
Council commented in a meeting, “…the situation in Georgia following 
the parliamentary elections held on 21 May 2008…were an important 
test for democracy” (Council 2008/1307).  
When democratic discourse was not framed in terms of elections 
and stability, the Council referred to democracy in very idealistic and 
normative terms. The following statements stem from a 2008 meeting 
(Council 2008/1397): “The EU side welcomed the recent commitments 
of President Saakashvili for strengthening democratic institutions in 
Georgia, and expected concrete steps in this sense. The Cooperation 
Council agreed that consolidation of democracy was the key to 
ensuring Georgia's long term stability and its successful transformation 
into a prosperous, harmonious and united society.” Similarly, in 2011, 
it issued a press release stating, “The EU supported the continuation of 
democratic reforms in Georgia and the need to consolidate democratic 
institutions, encourage political pluralism and enhance media freedom” 
(Council 2011/2346). 
The Council’s democratic discourse of Georgia was not evident 
during the most provocative political crises of the time period, notably 
the mass protests of late 2007 and the conflict with Russia. Though 
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the Council did indeed confront the Russian-Georgia conflict from 2008 
directly under the CFSP, it did so independently of democratic 
discourse and outside the dataset for this research. 
 
Overall, the Council emphasized elections primarily, but also 
stability and democratic norms. The Council considered elections to be 
barometers or tests of democracy for Georgia, and therefore placed 
great value on the procedural elements of elections. 
 
5.2.2 Council Discourse on Ukraine 
 The Council data on Ukraine included 47 documents with explicit 
connections to democracy. The data also emphasized elections in this 
case, as well as freedoms of the media. The data show one spike in 
particular in 2004, where the Council demonstrated trepidation over 
the elections that eventually sparked the orange revolution. After the 
orange revolution in early 2005, the rate of democratic discourse 
consistently declined with the exception of a small spike in 2010 
(presidential elections). The pattern of decline in democratic discourse 
suggests increased pessimism over the prospects of democracy in 
Ukraine throughout the years. 
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Figure 9: Council Data on Ukraine 
 
 
 The Council’s emphasis on elections was most dramatic in the 
time immediately preceding the color revolution. The 2004 scheduled 
election in question was between then-Prime Minister Viktor 
Yanukovych and handpicked candidate of the outgoing less-than-
democratic leader, and the leading opposition candidate, Viktor 
Yushchenko. The latter enjoyed a clear lead in the polls, but somehow 
Yanukovych won the runoff election. The unfair election sparked mass 
protests, which led to a rerun in December 2004 and the victory of 
Yushchenko in early 2005. Thus, the frequency of democratic 
discourse was undoubtedly highest during the presidential election of 
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2004, and the most obvious patterns were frequent references to free 
and fair elections, and electoral irregularities.  
 The Council was paying attention very closely and critically to 
the two rounds of elections. One of the important elements of a free 
and fair election process was the media. In response to the contested 
first round, the Council expressed, “regret that the first round of the 
elections had not met international standards. The EU had on several 
occasions urged the Ukrainian authorities to observe democratic 
principles and to redress the deficiencies, including by providing equal 
access to the media for the two candidates, so that the second round 
of elections could be free and fair” (Council 2004/1299; Council 
2005/1343). 
 The Council was equally critical of the second round of that 
presidential election, shortly before the orange revolution. Having 
“followed the second round of elections with great concern... the EU 
had on several occasions urged the Ukrainian authorities to observe 
democratic principles so that the second round of elections could be 
free and fair; that the second round of elections had clearly fallen 
short of international standards and that in view of the irregularities 
detailed in the OSCE/ ODIHR report the EU seriously questioned 
whether the official results fully reflected the will of the Ukrainian 
electorate” (Council 2004/1423). In fact, the Council perceived this as 
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a crucial election (Council 2004/1716): “The aftermath of the second 
round of the Ukrainian Presidential Elections has brought Ukraine to a 
cross-road in her development towards establishing a fully-fledged 
democratic society, and in the EU-Ukraine relationship.” Among the 
complaints lodged by the Council against the second round of elections 
were misconduct in the campaign period, reports of “widespread” 
intimidation, ballot-stuffing, and violence, among others (Council 
2004/1716).  
 After the orange revolution, the frequency of democratic 
discourse in Ukraine diminished considerably. The Council returned to 
issues of elections with the 2006 parliamentary round, which it 
considered successful and indicative of democratic consolidation 
(Council 2006/1436; Council 2006/1263): “that the elections, which 
were considered free and fair, consolidated the democratic 
breakthrough in Ukraine and should provide a strong basis for renewed 
efforts to move forward in key reforms aimed at strengthening the rule 
of law, transforming society and strengthening the market economy.” 
It also called the 2007 parliamentary elections “witness to Ukraine's 
progress in implementing its democratic reforms” (Council 
2008/1247). Thus, for the Council, elections pave the way for 
substantive democratic goals. Critical elections are even sufficiently a 
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benchmark for democratic consolidation, an otherwise much too low 
standard in the general scholarly community. 
 By 2010, as Yanukovych returned to the presidency and 
launched a criminal case against his greatest rival, Yulia Tymoshenko, 
the Council made references to human rights in four of seven 
documents from 2010 to 2011. However, these references never made 
an explicit connection between Yanukovych’s case against Tymoshenko 
and the state of democracy in Ukraine. Instead, it used vague 
language such as “respect for human rights” to state that such respect 
is crucial for EU-Ukrainian relations. The Council did not make the 
connection between the trial against Tymoshenko and the health of 
Ukrainian democracy until 2011, the year Tymoshenko was sentenced 
for alleged crimes; the Council noted “perceived deterioration of the 
quality of democracy and rule of law in Ukraine,” but did not expound 
any further. 
 
 Overall, the Council emphasized elections in its democratic 
discourse of Ukraine, as well as the media as an enabler of proper 
elections. There was an initial spike in democratic discourse shortly 
before and after the orange revolution, but the frequency of such 
discourse declined throughout the years. Conspicuously absent from 
the discourse was an explicit connection between the widely publicized 
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and criticized trial against Yulia Tymoshenko and democratic progress 
or backsliding in Ukraine. 
 
5.2.3 Council Discourse on The Kyrgyz Republic 
 The Council data on the Kyrgyz Republic included eight 
documents which addressed democracy directly. Unlike the other 
cases, the areas of focus in Kyrgyzstan were lofty democratic 
principles, with minimal discussion on which reforms would produce 
what effects. When the Council addressed elections in Kyrgyzstan, it 
did so superficially and collectively as an outcome, not a procedure 
with multiple potential points of failure. 
 
 
Figure 10: Council Data on Kyrgyzstan 
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 The few pieces of democratic discourse by the Council suggest 
that—whether the period was the 2005 tulip revolution, the 2009 
reelection of Bakiyev (the would-be reformer who was anything but), 
or the new revolution of 2010 and the subsequent ethnic conflict—the 
Council did not alter the frequency of democratic discourse. Instead, it 
simply “welcomed” the reforms on the incoming 2010 coalition 
government, for instance (Council 2010/2651). 
 In response to the events of the tulip revolution and the 
promises of democratic grandeur, the Council made the following 
comments (Council 2005/1726): 
The Cooperation Council was the first meeting at this level 
between the EU and the Kyrgyz Republic since the July 10 
Presidential elections in the country. It called on the Kyrgyz 
leadership to use this unique opportunity to fully embrace 
democratic values, develop economic and social policies and 
tackle wide-spread corruption, which are essential preconditions 
for sustainable development of the country. 
The EU welcomes and strongly supports close cooperation 
between the Kyrgyz government and the OSCE. The EU is 
willing to increase its political and economic cooperation with 
the Kyrgyz Republic provided that the Kyrgyz government 
demonstrates its commitment to reform, particularly in the 
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areas of constitutional reform, democratization and improving 
country's investment climate. 
 
 The comments above emphasize reforms at the leadership 
level—socioeconomic policy and constitutional reform, for instance. Yet 
a few years later, the Council shifted the burden of change from the 
political elite to the citizenry. The Council placed the responsibility of 
democratic reform with domestic actors, particularly civil society 
(Council 2009/1260): “The task of sustaining a culture of human rights 
and making democracy work for its citizens calls for the active 
involvement of civil society. A developed and active civil society and 
independent media are vital for the development of a pluralistic 
society. The EU will cooperate with the Central Asia states to this end 
and promote enhanced exchanges in civil society.” 
 Overall, the Council was supportive of democratization writ 
large, but it did not identify specific policies or political turning points 
that would either promote or hinder democracy. The Council 
maintained a consistent rate of discourse despite periodic political 
scandals otherwise related to democracy. 
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5.3 Discourse by the Parliament 
 
 As the institution most representative of the public and EU 
citizens, the Parliament is also the weakest in foreign affairs in terms 
of authority in the founding treaties of the EU. The Council consults 
with the Parliament on foreign affairs matters. This consultative 
relationship can take shape in several forms. The Parliament may ask 
the Council questions the latter must answer. The Parliament can also 
make policy recommendations to the Council, which may or may not 
be adopted. And, in issues areas outside the realm of CFSP, the 
Council must secure the consent of the Parliament for its decisions. 
Yet, only the Parliament can dismiss the Commission; while this has 
never happened, the Parliament can exercise pressure over the 
Commission in theory.  
The Parliament had the least number of data in the set, totaling 
48 documents. The data for the Parliament stem from minutes, 
reports, resolutions, press releases, statements, and the meetings of 
parliamentary subcommittees. Across the case studies, the Parliament 
adopted the most comprehensive view of democracy. Rather than 
emphasizing a particular facet of democracy, such as elections or rule 
of law, it viewed those elements as constituent parts of an overarching 
construct. For example, while elections may have been the defining 
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benchmark for the Council, elections in and of themselves did not 
define democratic success for the Parliament. The Parliament also 
adopted the most long-range perspective for the practical value of 
democratic reforms. Across the cases, the European Parliament 
couched democratization as closely intertwined with its long-term 
effects. Additionally, the Parliament was most directly critical of 
domestic decision-makers in the case studies and of fellow EU 
institutions. 
 
 
 
Figure 11: Parliamentary Data Linking Democracy and Case Study 
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5.3.1 Parliament Discourse on Georgia 
 The parliamentary data on Georgia included 16 documents that 
addressed democracy and Georgia concurrently. The data spiked in 
2007, the year when Georgian citizens hit the streets en masse to 
protest government corruption. Parliamentary discourse on Georgia 
was holistic. It identified wide-ranging concerns, such as transparency, 
judicial reform and independence, civil society, local-level governance, 
and freedom of expression, among many others. 
 
 
 
Figure 12: Parliament Data on Georgia 
  
The Parliament’s holistic view of democracy was set in the 
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that, despite applauding the conduct of the first major elections 
following the rose revolution, democratic elections would only become 
increasingly more challenging throughout the years as the system 
became more competitive (EP 2004/2883). The Parliament was 
optimistic of the rose revolution, though “Georgia still had to face a 
number of issues, including improving the rule of law, reform of the 
public service, economic reforms, and the reform of the judicial 
system” (EP 2005/2886). In 2006, the year before the big protests of 
2007, the Parliamentary Cooperation Committee (PCC) on Georgia 
noted numerous areas of concern (EP 2006/2893): “stresses the need 
for Georgian government to focus on the continuation of the political 
and economic reform process, strengthening the respect for the rule of 
law, the independence of the judiciary, human rights, consolidating a 
democratic system of government, the development of civil society, 
media freedom, environmental protection, sustainable development 
and poverty reduction.” The same document “call[ed] on the Council 
and the Commission to take into account the views of the European 
Parliament during the consultation process.” 
 The spike in data in 2007 revealed a similar pattern in which the 
Parliament outlined a comprehensive critique of democracy spanning 
numerous weaknesses. A report that year outlined the need to work 
on government-opposition dialogue, rule of law, human rights, 
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judiciary independence, and many other basic freedoms and features 
of Western democracies (EP 2007/2856). Data from the minutes of a 
PCC meeting included a parliamentarian who (EP 2007/2910): 
“stressed that as part of the democratization process, there are 
positive points mentioned by various NGOs such as the electoral 
process, freedom of the media, local governance, and that they 
certainly welcome the electoral process because it was deemed by the 
international community to have taken place at European standards. 
She also stressed the importance of being prudent in putting pressure 
on all authorities, and she drew attention to “corruption, independence 
of the judiciary and dialogue between government and the civil 
society…” The final parliamentary recommendations from that same 
PCC meeting included regard for local level democracy (EP 
2007/2911): “deems that the reinforcement of local democracy and 
self-governance is an effective instrument for the modernization of the 
territorial administrative configuration of Georgia.”  
 The Parliament’s Committee on Foreign Affairs mulled over a set 
of proposed amendments in 2007 for EU policy. The document went 
through a thorough count of both improvements and shortcomings in 
democracy, and it proposed specific paragraphs to a policy proposal 
under consideration by the Council (EP 2007/2861):  
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Reiterates its continuing support for Georgia's efforts to 
introduce political and economic reforms and to strengthen its 
democratic institutions, thereby building a peaceful and 
prosperous Georgia that can contribute to stability both in the 
region and in the rest of Europe; expresses deep concern over 
the recent developments in Georgia, which escalated into a 
violent police crackdown on peaceful demonstrations, the 
closing down of independent media outlets and the declaration 
of the state of emergency; welcomes the decision by the 
Georgian authorities to hold early presidential elections and a 
referendum on the timing of parliamentary elections, in order to 
restore the democratic conditions for free and fair elections and 
the referendum; calls on the Georgian government, as a matter 
of urgency, to: – respect the rule of law and restore media 
freedom; – engage in a meaningful dialogue with the opposition 
forces and with the public; – carry out a thorough, impartial and 
independent investigation into the serious violations of human 
rights and freedom of the media, and bring the cases concerned 
to a fair trial;” 
And— 
Underlines the crucial importance of an independent and 
effective judiciary as a central element of solid democracy; 
encourages the countries of the South Caucasus to implement 
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judiciary reforms in conformity with European standards; 
supports the exchange of experience in this field. 
 
 Documents from the subsequent years continued to balance 
praise with criticism across an array of democracy features. The 
Parliament called for conditionality in 2010, stating that “EU assistance 
should take place within the framework of political conditionality, such 
as progress in political dialogue and reform and democratization 
processes” (EP 2010/3012). 
 
5.3.2 Parliament Discourse on Ukraine 
 The database included 26 pieces of data which explicitly linked 
democracy and Ukraine. The frequency of discourse spiked in 2007. As 
in Georgia, the Parliament maintained a holistic perspective of 
Ukrainian democracy, in which elections were as important as freedom 
of assembly and democratic institutions. The European Parliament was 
also very direct in its criticism of democracy in Ukraine.  
 2007 was a year of political discord between coalition and 
opposition factions in the Ukrainian parliament, which ultimately led to 
the calling of early parliamentary elections in June 24 of that year. The 
crisis stemmed from a conflict between President Yanukovych and the 
Ukrainian Parliament which led to thousands of supporters gathering in 
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support of each faction. Yanukovych dismissed the Parliament in April, 
while the legality of his decision was contested in the courts. After 
much quarreling, an agreement was made to hold early parliamentary 
elections in June. 
 
 
Figure 13: Parliament Data on Ukraine 
 
 
 Of the three EU institutions, the Parliament had the greatest 
discourse regarding Ukrainian parliamentary affairs. The European 
Parliament addressed the 2007 crisis very directly and didactically: It 
urged Ukraine to resolve the tensions between President and 
Parliament “swiftly”, and to “further consolidate the footings of liberal 
democracy” as it was “currently in a transition period…decisive for the 
long-term stabilization of the country, for safeguarding of democracy, 
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pluralism and the rule of law and for anchoring Ukraine in the 
European democratic community” (EP 2007/2829).  
The EU Parliament described progress in democracy as residing 
in “a stable constitutional system, the protection of individual 
freedoms, strengthening democratic control mechanisms and stable 
anchoring of the rule of law” (EP 2007/2829). The institutional 
tensions between the president and parliament of Ukraine, and the 
subsequent demonstrations, were the context for the following press 
release by the EU Parliament (EP 2007/2909): “Building a successful 
and democratic future in Europe will require from Ukraine institutions 
and rules that are strong, clear and legitimate and a political culture in 
which all forces accept their share of responsibility…. Therefore, 
without further delay the Ukrainian political and civic leaders should 
agree on a comprehensive constitutional reform, aimed at improving 
the system of checks and balances, clarifying the separation of powers 
and reaffirming the supremacy of the rule of law… All these issues 
should be addressed by the political players of the country without 
involving the street action. The politicians must now concentrate on 
agreements made and not on their disagreements.” 
        In the years that followed the crisis, the Parliament noted the 
improvements and shortcomings of democracy in Ukraine. Elections 
were considered important but they were by no means the sole 
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benchmarks of democracy. A 2010 statement said, “The EP delegation 
noted that the election process was carried out correctly but… any 
functioning democracy also needs a wider, long term legal framework. 
Accordingly to [a parliamentarian] ‘this election clearly showed that 
Ukraine is consistently moving towards political stability and maturity. 
The next step should be to restart the long postponed reforms of the 
country for the benefit of Ukrainians” (EP 2010/2963). The Ministers of 
the EU Parliament were “deeply concerned that media freedom and 
independence have come under pressure in recent months and draw 
attention to the disappearance of the editor-in-chief of a newspaper 
that focuses on corruption. They also call for an investigation of the 
Ukrainian USB Security Service, its politicization and possible 
‘interference in the democratic process’" (EP 2010/2972). 
The Parliament grew especially critical of Ukrainian democracy 
by 2010. Whereas in 2007 it encouraged institutional and 
constitutional reform, in 2010 it exhibited concerns of democratic 
backsliding—that is, Ukraine was losing many of the democratic gains 
it had accumulated in the preceding years. A 2010 resolution reflects 
the Parliament’s holistic view of democracy in 2010 Ukraine (EP 
2010/3014): 
…allegations have been made that democratic freedoms, such 
as freedom of assembly, freedom of expression and freedom of 
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the media, have come under pressure in recent months… the 
establishment of a democratic, effective and durable system of 
checks and balances should remain a priority and the process 
for achieving this should be open, inclusive and accessible to all 
political parties and actors in Ukraine… following the presidential 
elections held in January 2010 there are increasingly worrying 
signs of a lessening of respect for  democracy and pluralism, as 
evidenced, in particular, by the treatment of some NGOs and 
individual complaints by journalists about pressure from their 
editors or the owners of their media outlets to cover or not 
cover certain events, as well as increased and politically 
motivated activity by the Ukrainian Security Service (SBU) and 
the misuse of administrative and judicial resources for political 
purposes… [The Parliament] is concerned at recent 
developments that could undermine media freedom and 
pluralism; calls on the authorities to take all necessary 
measures to protect these essential aspects of a democratic 
society and to refrain from any attempt to control, directly or 
indirectly, the content of reporting in the national media; 
stresses the urgent need for a reform of the laws governing the 
media sector […] Emphasizes the need to strengthen the 
credibility, stability, independence and effectiveness of  
institutions, thereby guaranteeing democracy and the rule of 
law and promoting a consensual constitutional reform process 
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based on the clear separation of powers and effective checks 
and balances between state institutions […] Calls on all the 
relevant political stakeholders, including the government and 
opposition, to take part in this process… 
 
  
Thus the EU Parliament focused on a wide range of democratic 
elements in Ukraine—whether praise or criticism. It was most critical 
about how the President and Ukrainian Parliament interacted in 2007, 
citing separation of powers and political culture as the underlying 
culprits (EP 2007/2909).  
 
5.3.3 Parliament Discourse on The Kyrgyz Republic 
The parliamentary data on Kyrgyzstan linking democracy and the 
case study explicitly totaled only six documents, and they were spread 
into 1-2 documents every other year. It viewed democracy in 
Kyrgyzstan as extremely fragile, yet promising. The Parliament 
explicitly referenced the EU Commission and the Council, who have 
more authority than the Parliament, to support Kyrgyzstan in its 
democratic endeavors.  
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Figure 14: Parliament Data on Kyrgyzstan 
 
 
In its 2005 document, the Parliament was very optimistic of the 
tulip revolution and the potential that it could serve as a model for the 
rest of the Central Asian states (EP 2005/2997): “[The Parliament] 
intends firmly to support the current democratic transition in 
Kyrgyzstan, the effective exercise of freedoms – especially 
fundamental rights, freedom of expression, freedom to oppose the 
regime and press freedom – and genuine, transparent elections; 
Believes that a proper democratic process in Kyrgyzstan could provide 
an excellent example for the other Central Asian countries; Calls on 
the Kyrgyz Interim Government to steer a democratic course by 
embarking on a policy of dialogue and national reconciliation, and to 
maintain public order; Calls on the authorities of Kyrgyzstan to make 
every effort to start a real process of democratization of the country 
based on a genuine multi-party system and respect for human rights 
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and the rule of law; welcomes, in this connection, the initiation of an 
inclusive process of constitutional reform aimed at ensuring that the 
previous system of  power is fundamentally changed; Urges the 
Commission to find ways to upgrade the Partnership and Cooperation 
Agreement with Kyrgyzstan and adjust it to the new situation, defining 
democratic and economic benchmarks such as should lead to 
enhanced relations.” A similar optimism was evident in a 2007 
document from the Parliament, in which it noted that Kyrgyzstan had 
“the potential to become an example for all the other Central Asia 
states in the areas of democracy, human rights, and rule of law” (EP 
2007/2832). 
Despite its optimism, the Parliament was very critical of 
democracy in Kyrgyzstan. A 2007 strategy paper highlighted 
shortcomings in human rights, including the purported abuse of 
women (EP 2007/2832), treatment of political prisoners, independence 
of the media, and rule of law (EP 2007/2858). A 2008 document was 
critical of the Central Asian region as whole, and in Kyrgyzstan it 
specified the “fragile democratic institutions”, the need “to safeguard 
the appropriate checks and balances,” and condemned “crackdowns” 
on civil society (EP 2008/3005). Noting the failed promises of the tulip 
revolution, the Parliament had the following to say about renewed 
promises in 2010 (EP 2010/3010): “Points out that the Tulip 
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Revolution of 2005 had created strong expectations of democratic 
reforms in Kyrgyz society that did not materialize; calls on the Council 
and the Commission to show coherence and assertiveness and to use 
this opportunity to find ways to assist the provisional government of 
Kyrgyzstan and help the authorities to pursue democratic reforms and 
improve peoples’ lives through national development and the 
empowerment of citizens in cooperation with all the stakeholders and 
Kyrgyz civil society.” 
The Parliament’s view of democracy in Kyrgyzstan was therefore 
a heightened optimism for the potential it could serve as a model for 
the region juxtaposed with a critical assessment of wide-ranging 
shortcomings in democracy.  
 
5.4 Democratic Discourse Summary by Case Study 
 
 In the case of Georgia, the Commission focused on rule of law, 
institution building, and elections. The spike in 2008 revealed a 
sensitivity regarding the late 2007 protests against corruption, the 
government crackdown, early elections, and conflict with Russia—all in 
the same time period. The Commission paid most attention to the 
events of that year more than any other event by any of the 
institutions. With Georgia, the Commission was most critical of the 
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government’s ability to maintain order in politically palatable ways and 
to maintain stability in the country. This overarching concern 
surpassed the important of transition politics during the rose 
revolution. 
 In the case of Georgia, the Council emphasized elections and 
stability, as well as the norms and ideals deemed central to any 
Western style democracy. The Council’s discourse on Georgia 
demonstrated that critical elections were consistently the test and 
benchmark for democracy in Georgia. Otherwise, discourse focused on 
what norms Georgian democracy ought to aspire to attain. These 
concerns surpassed concerns of human rights, corruption, and rule of 
law. Finally, the Parliament adopted a holistic view of democracy 
exemplified by a comprehensive critique of democratic gains and 
shortcomings. The data spiked in 2007 more than it did in 2008, 
meaning the popular unrest from 2007 received more attention than 
the subsequent elections and conflict with Russia. [See Figure 15] 
In the case of Ukraine, the case study with most attention of all, 
the pattern exhibited by the Commission was an emphasis on 
elections, rule of law, and basic rights. The spike in 2010-2011 
demonstrated a basic human rights concern framed in terms of rule 
law—the concern was that the criminal case against a major opposition 
figure was politically motivated. The Commission also addressed 
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Ukraine’s desire for future membership more often in this case than 
did any other institution for any other case. The Commission’s 
attention to the Yanukovych-Tymoshenko crisis surpassed the 
democratic discourse it devoted to the orange revolution. 
 
 
 
Figure 15: Total Data for Georgia 
 
 
 In the case of Ukraine, the Council emphasized elections most of 
all, but also the media, and Western norms of democracy. The spike in 
democratic discourse at the time of the orange revolution 
demonstrated its focus on the promises of the transition. After the 
orange revolution, the Council never devoted as much democratic 
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
18
20
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
D
a
ta
 F
r
e
q
u
e
n
c
y
 
Year 
Total Data for Democracy and Georgia 
Commission, N=31 Council, N=27
Parliament, N=16 Total, N=74
159 
 
discourse to Ukraine again. Finally, the Parliament maintained a 
holistic view of democracy in Ukraine. There was a noticeable spike in 
democratic discourse in 2007, a year of significant discourse among 
Ukraine’s legislators and between the president and the parliament. 
The institutional crisis in Ukraine received more attention from the EU 
Parliament than the orange revolution, the human rights crisis of 
Tymoshenko’s imprisonment, or any election. [See Figure 16] 
 
 
Figure 16: Total Data for Ukraine 
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basic human rights and fundamental freedoms. The Commission’s data 
spiked in 2010, the year of the second revolution; the Commission 
addressed democracy in Kyrgyzstan more than the other institutions. 
The Council and the Parliament addressed Kyrgyzstan directly less 
frequently, and they tended to discuss Central Asia as a region more 
broadly than Kyrgyzstan as an individual state and context. [See 
Figure 17] 
 
 
Figure 17: Total Data for Kyrgyzstan 
 
 
 
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
D
a
ta
 F
r
e
q
u
e
n
c
y
 
Year 
Total Data for Democracy and Kyrgyzstan 
Commission, N=21 Council, N=8
Parliament, N=6 Total, N=35
161 
 
5.5 Conclusion 
 
Each of the three major EU institutions demonstrated different 
patterns of democratic discourse in the data (see Table 5). The 
Commission demonstrated emphases of rule of law and elections, as 
well as basic rights and freedoms. The Commission was most sensitive 
to political crises, as it was the institution with the most discernible 
spikes in each case study. The Council emphasized elections, and it 
otherwise adopted discourse of lofty principles, norms, and ideals. The 
Parliament adopted a more holistic perspective of democracy, one in 
which elections and rule of law were but pieces of a larger democratic 
puzzle. The Parliament was more critical of not only the actors and 
institutions within the case studies, but also of its peer European 
institutions.  
 
Table 5: Patterns of Discourse 
 Georgia Ukraine Kyrgyzstan Overall 
Commission Rule of Law, 
Institution 
Building, 
Elections  
Elections, Rule 
of Law, Basic 
Rights 
Basic Values 
and 
Fundamental 
Freedoms 
Rule of Law, 
Elections 
Council Elections, 
Stability, 
Norms 
Elections, 
Media 
Norms Elections, 
Norms 
Parliament Holistic and 
Accountability 
Holistic and 
Accountability 
Holistic and 
Accountability 
Holistic and 
Accountability 
 
 
The patterns identified in the table above will be discussed 
further in the next chapter.  
162 
 
 
 
Chapter 6: Explaining Convergence and Divergence 
 
The data in the previous chapter reveal patterns that suggest 
the European Union’s role as a cohesive global actor is challenged by 
its own institutional dynamics. This chapter explores the explanation 
for the varying patterns between institutions. 
 
6.1 Constructing Democracy through Discourse 
 
The Commission tended to emphasize rule of law and elections 
in its construction of democracy. The Commission described 
democracy in procedural terms that valued stability and order. 
Elections were the venue for these values, but rule of law was the 
critical enabling factor for democracy.  
The Council emphasized elections above all else, while it adopted 
discourse of lofty principles, norms, and ideals in between. It 
constructed democracy in minimalist and procedural terms that 
distinctly valued critical elections as tests of democracy.  
Finally, the Parliament adopted a holistic perspective of 
democracy, and it did so very critically of decision-makers both within 
the target country and within the EU. Elections and rule of law were 
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not independently paramount but rather elements of a larger 
construction that included everything from substantive elements to 
procedural factors. 
The three constructions of democracy therefore reveal different 
ways each institution judged democracy—different priorities and 
concerns. All three institutions valued the procedural facet of 
democracy, including elections, rule of law, and institutional 
accountability. However, the three institutions varied in the extent of 
the substantive sphere of democracy, like civil and political freedoms.    
  
6.2 Explaining Convergence and Divergence 
 
 This research proposes that the following may explain the 
institutional dynamics observed in this research: the institutions of the 
EU have different stakes in foreign policy commitments and outcomes. 
Institutions with greater authority to act in foreign affairs, based on 
the powers granted to them in EU treaties, perceive greater stakes in 
decision-making. Institutional authority means an institution has the 
ability to demand and enforce (such as conditionality). If an institution 
enjoys such authority, it can exercise it either formally through public 
conditions or pre-conditions, or informally through recommendations 
and pressure rather than explicit prerequisites. Institutional stakes are 
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the vested interests of institutions regarding outcomes based on 
tangible losses for that particular institution. 
This research hypothesized a negative relationship between 
institutional authority abroad and levels of democratic discourse. That 
is, the least powerful institutional actor of the EU, the Parliament, 
would have been most likely to use democratic discourse in reference 
to the non-member-states, because the limited impact of its 
discourse—due to lack of incentives and disincentives—allowed it to 
make bolder statements. The inverse was expected to hold as well, 
since greater institutional authority abroad leads to greater 
responsibility and accountability. If an institution has less authority in 
foreign affairs, then it faces fewer repercussions when using 
democratic discourse, as it will likely not be held accountable for the 
fulfillment of such norms in EU relationships with target states. These 
dynamics were observed in the democratic discourse, which were the 
outcomes that captured EU institutional dynamics in EU policy. 
The reason why institutions with greater authority in foreign 
affairs perceive greater stakes relates to two measures, based on 
Levitsky and Way (2005), of perceived loss proposed earlier in the 
research. The first measure is whether there were competing issues on 
the institutional agenda. The second measure is the degree of 
economic, geopolitical, and social linkages to the case study. 
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Throughout the discourse, a competing interest for the Commission 
was the prospect of membership for the case study. This explains why 
the Commission was extremely cautious to link democratic reform to 
the possibility of membership in Ukraine most of all. The discourse also 
demonstrated a competing interest of stability along the periphery. 
The Council, on the other hand, had competing interests at the 
national level. This was most evident in the limited CFSP policy areas, 
though most of the discourse fell outside the CFSP. The discourse by 
the Council demonstrated a “lowest-denominator” pattern which 
suggests that it allowed for such competing interests to be channeled 
at the national level, independent from the EU. The Parliament, 
however, did not have the authority to lead foreign policy, but it did 
have an interest in accruing greater institutional authority relative to 
the other institutions. This institutional stake was evident in the 
Parliament’s intermittent calls for the Commission and the Council to 
pursue a particular type of policy or approach in the target country, 
such as conditionality.  
The second measure of perceived loss, or stakes, was the 
linkage between the EU and the case study. This measure helps 
explain why discourse was highest across the institutions for Ukraine, 
second highest for Georgia, and lowest for Kyrgyzstan. Kyrgyzstan had 
the lowest linkages relative to the other case studies: it is far more 
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dependent economically, geopolitically, and socially to Russia than the 
West. Despite Georgia’s yearning for deeper linkages with the West, 
the perceived loss of ties to Ukraine was more geopolitically 
consequential than Georgia, and as such may have prompted greater 
discourse.  
 
 
 
Figure 18: Institutional Authority and Democratic Discourse  
 
 
Figure 18 demonstrates how institutional authority relates to the 
democratic discourse, based on the data. In the figure, I propose five 
Commission 
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• Most Authority Abroad 
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Parliament 
(Subnational) 
• Least Authority Abroad 
• Most critical 
• Most holistic construction of democracy 
• Highest rate of democratic discourse 
• Negative relationship between authority and discourse 
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categories to illustrate the analysis. First is the level of institutional 
authority, which is the ability to demand and enforce. This was 
determined according to the role the institutions played in the foreign 
affairs of the case studies. The Commission had the greatest authority, 
because it was the EU’s lead negotiator and foreign representative on 
all but the most sensitive security issues. The Council had much less 
breadth of authority in foreign affairs, except for very limited security 
policy issues falling under the CFSP. The CFSP has been reserved for 
the discretion of interstate deliberation through the Council because of 
the sensitive nature of defense and security. Due to the limited scope 
of the CFSP in this study, the Council was weaker than the 
Commission in general foreign affairs.  
The second indicator is how critical the institution was of 
democracy in the case studies, qualitatively. This reflects the extent to 
which the institution discussed the scope of challenges facing the case 
studies in overall democratic processes when compared to the other 
EU institutions. The third element summarizes the general pattern of 
democratic discourse based on the conclusions from chapter 5. The 
fourth factor is the rate of democratic discourse. This is the frequency 
of codes that link “democracy” and the case study explicitly in the 
coded dataset relative to the raw dataset. The last indicator is a direct 
response to the hypothesized relationship between institutional 
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authority and rate of discourse. The assessment is whether a negative 
or positive relationship exists.  
 In each institution, there was a negative relationship between 
that particular institution’s authority in matters of foreign affairs and in 
the level of democratic discourse it employed throughout the case 
studies. The institution with the least power abroad used the highest 
rate of democratic discourse. The reason for this consistency was the 
weight and gravity of democratic discourse—the more powerful 
institutions were more likely to be held accountable for discourse and 
thus had a greater stake in it. 
 The Commission was the institution with the greatest ability to 
exercise authority, relative to the other EU institutions, in its relations 
with the case studies. The primary way it could do this was through 
conditionality. Conditionality is the "exercise of policy instruments by 
one party to secure compliance and shape the actions of another 
party,” and it can be formal or informal. The former can be identified 
when conditions or pre-conditions are publicly stated, whereas the 
latter manifests through recommendations or pressure rather than 
explicit prerequisites. In democratic discourse, the Commission utilized 
conditionality only informally. That is, the Commission did not 
establish explicit pre-conditions of democratic reform in exchange for 
incentives, as it did with so many former Soviet satellites seeking 
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accession. Instead, it expressed the standards of rule of law, elections, 
and stability. The rewards for progress in those sectors—in other 
words, conditionality—were implicit in the potential access to funds, 
resources, and markets. 
 The Council of the EU had select authority in foreign matters, 
restricted only to “high-level politics” of sensitive defense and security 
issues. To provide a sample of the kinds of policy reserved for the 
Council under the CFSP, matters such as sanctions, terrorism, 
proliferation, and arms trade, and places like Iran, Syria, Libya, 
Afghanistan and Iraq, Somalia, and Sudan were most common during 
the time period of this study.  
 The Council exercised its authority under CFSP in the case 
studies in the following occasions. It dealt with Georgia in the 
aftermath of the 2008 South Ossetia War, when it sent an EU 
Monitoring Mission to serve as peace monitors and observers in the 
conflict zones. There was no explicit democratic discourse in those 
documents, which were therefore not part of the dataset of this study. 
It also dealt with Georgia by sending a Brussels-based “Special 
Representative.” The Special Representative’s mission was to ensure 
stability and to monitor the conflict areas. At no point was there 
explicit democratic discourse in the context of the Special 
Representative to Georgia. The third and final instance of CFSP activity 
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in Georgia was an early rule of law mission, sent in 2004 under the 
CFSP’s predecessor (the Common Foreign and Defense Policy) for one 
year to support and advise Georgian decision-makers. The sole 
reference to democracy was a brief description of another separate 
document, already included in the dataset for this research. 
The CFSP was invoked only one time in Ukraine in 2005, when 
the Council supported Ukraine financially in its efforts to combat the 
accumulation of small arms and light weapons. It never invoked 
democratic discourse in that case. The Council dealt with Kyrgyzstan 
under the CFSP on one occasion, also sending a Special 
Representative. The Special Representative was assigned to the 
Central Asian region and based in Brussels. The primary mission was 
to promote good relations with the region, contribute to stability, 
address key threats, and “contribute to strengthening democracy, rule 
of law, good governance and respect for human rights and 
fundamental freedoms in Central Asia,” which was the sole reference 
to democracy. The CFSP documents on the Special Representative 
were very technical, covering aspects such as financing of the position, 
composition of the staff, in-country privileges and immunities, and the 
team’s security. Otherwise, there was no discourse of democracy or of 
related substantive issues. 
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 The Council did indeed enjoy power in narrow but significant 
policy areas, and it exercised authority in the case studies during the 
aforementioned instances. However, it had the lowest rate of 
democratic discourse relative to the other institutions and heavily 
emphasized elections when it did discuss democracy. Because the 
Council represents the interests of member-states, rather than the EU 
as a whole, the Council likely moderated its democratic discourse due 
to shared values of sovereignty. In other words, it does not behoove 
states—especially member-states with fragile democracies of their 
own—to be highly critical of neighboring states. Furthermore, 
individual member-states were not confined to the EU sphere and 
could still act independently through the foreign ministries of their own 
states. This allowed them to circumvent institutional chokepoints 
within the EU. 
 The Parliament was the least powerful in the foreign affairs 
arena, relative to the other institutions, yet it demonstrated high rates 
of democratic discourse. The Parliament does not have any authority 
in the CFSP, but it does retain some powers in other foreign policy 
areas. The Parliament must agree with the Council on decisions 
proposed by the Commission, or else they need to amend the proposal 
until an agreement is reached. In the scope of this research, this 
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process in the foreign affairs arena never failed to reach consensus, 
and amendments to such proposals were included in the dataset.  
Though the Parliament did not have the power to leverage 
conditionality or to send special envoys, it was still very critical of 
democracy in the three case studies and of its fellow institutions. The 
Parliament does not represent the interests of the EU as a whole or the 
interests of the states; instead it represents the collective interests of 
EU citizens, who may share similar concerns of democracy in their own 
home states. The Parliament may have been exerting itself through 
discourse despite limited authority in an effort to demand greater 
powers in the future. This is consistent with the Parliament’s 
incremental growth of powers throughout the years. 
 
6.3 Conclusion 
 
 The data from the previous chapter demonstrated that patterns 
of democratic discourse existed in the three institutions of the EU. This 
chapter argued that each institution had stakes in foreign 
commitments and outcomes. The greater the stake, the less 
democratic discourse was used, indicating a negative relationship 
between institutional authority abroad and levels of democratic 
discourse. The institution would face repercussions commensurate with 
173 
 
its foreign powers when using democratic discourse, because it could 
be held accountable for such discourse. The next chapter will conclude 
with the implications of this research. 
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Chapter 7: Conclusions and Implications 
 
7.1 Concluding Comments 
 
 Since the Treaty of the European Union in 1993, the EU has 
embraced institutional reforms with the stated purpose of greater unity 
and cohesion abroad. The prospects have been dim, as the EU has 
struggled to project itself as a unitary actor in foreign matters. The 
political and economic transitions of Central and Eastern Europe 
following the collapse of communism provided it with an opportunity to 
assume a leading role across a wide range of reforms. Indeed, in 
matters of democracy, the EU seems to have maintained a consistent 
and common position.  
 The color revolutions that began with Georgia in 2003, spread to 
Ukraine in 2004, and reached Kyrgyzstan in 2005 could have been 
another opportunity for the EU to exert itself as a unitary actor in 
former Soviet space. At the time, the EU was still reeling from the 
recent decision to accept ten former Soviet satellites. Despite a 
consistent commitment to democracy in the former Soviet states, even 
if in rhetoric only, the EU struggled to remain the strong regional actor 
it was reputed to be elsewhere in Central Eastern Europe. 
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 This research asked whether the institutions of the EU promote 
or hinder the EU’s ability to act as a global unitary actor. It selected an 
issue area in which the EU would be “most likely”, based on precedent, 
to display a common position: democratic discourse. It chose case 
studies that did not have immediate prospects of membership and 
were located in former Soviet space during a time “most likely” to be 
receptive to democratic discourse: Georgia, Ukraine, and the Kyrgyz 
Republic, all from 2003 to 2011. It used official institutional documents 
from the European Commission, the Council of the EU, and the 
European Parliament to identify patterns of discourse in the 
construction of democracy.  
The analysis demonstrated that, across the institutions, 
democratic discourse was only consistent in the minimal procedural 
requirements, such as elections and rule of law, but the institutions 
diverged considerably in the extent to which democratic reform could 
be judged as such. It argued that a reason for these differences was a 
negative relationship between institutional authority in foreign policy 
making and rate of democratic discourse. 
The findings indicate that the limits of the EU as a unitary actor 
are not to be found only in national-level divergences. Instead, the EU 
as a whole and its institutions represent competing interests, as well, 
which present potential challenges to unitary policy abroad. 
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The lack of institutional cohesiveness in normative affairs points 
to the limits of EU institutional consolidation. Nevertheless, this 
characteristic may actually serve as a safety valve for the EU by 
allowing competing interests to exist within the same organization. 
This safety valve is also a form of burden sharing within the EU. When 
consensus is a requirement, such as the limited sensitive policy areas 
of the CFSP, the EU is much more vulnerable to undermining divisions. 
This stems from the voting structure in CFSP versus non-CFSP policies: 
the policy process of the former requires unanimity among all 
member-states in most cases, while the latter requires a qualified 
majority.  
 When consensus is not a requirement, ambiguity can be 
beneficial to balance realpolitik with normative pressures. It also 
provides windows of opportunity for interest and identity formation. 
The Parliament highlights this dynamic well, because it is able to 
pursue greater institutional power throughout the years, essentially 
challenging the EU hierarchy itself. Challenges to the structure and 
hierarchy in EU foreign affairs can redistribute power among the 
institutions and thus shape future patterns of integration. 
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7.2 Implications for Defining Democracy 
 
Though the European Union as a whole does not have an official 
definition of democracy, this research indicates that each of the three 
institutions conceptualize and embrace different definitions of 
democracy. Overall, the Commission, or the supranational 
representative, had the “middle of the road” approach; the Council, or 
the intergovernmental decision-maker, had the most minimalist 
approach; and the Parliament, or the subnational consultant, was the 
most critical of all. From their discourse, the following definitions can 
be deduced.  
The Commission emphasized rule of law and elections, and it 
constructed democracy as a procedural phenomenon. Democracy for 
the Commission is a stable system with regular elections, and without 
gross violations of political, civil, and human rights. This is a mostly 
procedural definition, although the Commission does have an unstated 
threshold for substantive dimensions of democracy, most evident in 
discursive spikes during political crises. For democracy theory, the 
Commission’s preference for stability is reminiscent of Huntingtonian 
political order (Huntington 1968), which posed the controversial 
argument that political order was a necessary precondition of 
democracy. As the institution entrusted to guard EU supranational 
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interests, this conceptualization of democracy indicates a concern for 
stability along the neighboring corridors of the EU.  
The Council emphasized critical elections heavily. Democracy for 
the Council is a system with successful elections—as measured by 
third party NGOs. This reflects a minimalist definition of democracy 
similar to traditional democracy theory. Schumpeter (1942) argued 
that democracy ensures minimal procedures and structures are in 
place for elite competition, and voters choose among the competing 
elites. Adam Przeworski (1999, 23), who views democracy as simply a 
system in which rulers are elected, argues that additional criteria 
beyond minimalist definitions—while important for the quality of 
democracy and its prospects for survival—are not necessary for the 
basic definition itself (50). The Council’s tendency to characterize 
democracy in basic minimalist terms reflects the intergovernmental 
nature of the institution. The Council comprises so many different 
members with very distinct political pasts—Western liberal societies, 
fascism, communism, and the various domestic political crises in 
between—that a “common denominator” definition of democracy may 
be the best one it can invoke. 
The Parliament constructed democracy with substantive and 
procedural standards higher than the other institutions. This suggests 
the Parliament defines democracy as a complex web of indicators. The 
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Parliament’s view of democracy is most similar to the post-1980s trend 
in the democracy literature, which was influenced by the transitions of 
southern Europe, and Central and Eastern Europe. The 
democratization theorists who looked at democracy as multifaceted in 
nature were critical of minimalist definitions. Furthermore, the 
Parliament’s view of democracy is careful not to assume any reform is 
necessarily democratic. This perspective is like Levitsky and Way 
(2002), who argued that some transitions can lead to hybrid 
nondemocratic regimes. As the institution most representative of 
European citizens, this conceptualization of democracy may be 
indicative of popular perspectives regarding their own national 
democracies. 
Nevertheless, the lack of an explicit definition of democracy in 
the EU may actually behoove the organization. It may reflect a 
concern over whether EU members themselves can meet democratic 
criteria, as many of them are fraught with scandals of their own. The 
ambiguity in the definition affords EU members some protection from 
being criticized over democracy domestically. In addition to member-
states, the EU itself has also been subject to criticism for its lack of 
democratic credentials: only the Parliament is democratically elected, 
and the other institutions lack transparency in their decision-making 
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processes. Therefore, the lack of a definition also provides the EU itself 
some protection from similar criticism. 
On the other hand, if democracy is defined too minimally, non-
member-states could claim democracy prematurely, especially in 
places where membership is geographically possible. Such ambiguity 
in the definition allows for discretion over who to deem as democratic 
or not, especially when democracy is considered the most vital 
requirement for potential membership.  
Though ambiguity is beneficial by balancing the pressures of 
pragmatism versus idealism, it also undermines the EU’s ability to 
adopt a clear stance on basic human rights and political crises in many 
cases. The lack of a definition or common understanding of what 
democracy should mean leads the EU to adopt inconsistent rhetoric 
and action. In some instances of human rights violations or gross 
political setbacks, the EU’s failure to embrace a consistent 
interpretation of democracy tarnishes its image as a normative actor in 
the world. 
 
7.3 International Relations and Integration Revisited 
 
 The implications of this research also contribute to theoretical 
discussions in international relations regarding the value of 
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international institutions. It moved away from the neorealist 
assumption that states are inherently in conflict and thus cannot 
achieve meaningful cooperation through institutions unless it is to 
ensure survival and security. Based on the EU’s experiences in Central 
and Eastern European reforms, the views inherent in regime theory 
were a useful premise instead. Regime theory argues that international 
regimes allow interdependent states to pursue objectives they could 
not realize on their own through policy coordination (Keohane 1984, 
97).  
 Nevertheless, there are limits to a liberal institutionalist 
understanding of the EU due to the inter-institutional discord evident 
in discourse. These limits are best understood by the constructivist 
lens, because the interests of institutions and the interests of 
individual agency (whether the member-state or actors within the 
institution itself) comingle to produce a complex web of competing 
interests. While this may be a prominent feature of bureaucratic 
politics in general, it becomes a problem in practice when the EU tries 
to assert itself as a unitary actor and as it tries to promote democracy 
as a precondition for membership. 
Another limit of liberal institutionalism best captured by 
constructivism is the assumption in the former that the primary role of 
institutions is as facilitator between states (Hyde Pierce 2004, 104). As 
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this research shows and constructivism supports, institutions 
themselves are essential to the process of interest- and identity-
formation (104). This was apparent when parliamentarians called for 
the Commission to utilize conditionality mechanisms in Georgia, for 
example. This was an instance of one institution seeking to shape 
shared interests with another institution through discourse. Another 
example is the Parliament’s gradually increasing role in foreign affairs, 
as evident in its growing power through treaties. This demonstrates 
that the Parliament, as an institution, is able to articulate its own 
interests independent of the traditional state. 
This research therefore contributes to the constructivist school of 
thought, in which discourse, ideas, and norms shape international 
relations. By looking for inter-institutional dynamics through discourse, 
this study demonstrated that different contexts demonstrated different 
levels of discourse. For example, the Commission’s sensitivity to 
political crises and the Council’s sensitivity to elections generated 
different constructions of democratic norms. Such findings support the 
constructivist argument that changing contexts affect how norms are 
constituted. 
By considering the authority of each institution to enforce norms, 
this research also contributes to constructivist arguments that assign 
agency to actors beyond the traditional state. For example, the 
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Commission is a supranational actor and institution, whose power of 
norms and discourse could be independent from the traditional state 
unit. While constituent member-states can still enjoy power through 
discourse, the Commission was the representative of the EU with the 
greatest ability to inject discourse in international negotiations and 
agreements.  
Despite any apparent inefficiencies or trouble conjuring up 
unitary actorhood in the EU, the history of EU institutional integration 
suggests that a possible theoretical explanation for inter-institutional 
divergences may be a lag in institutional development. In this case, a 
lag or gap exists between formal institutional design—such as those 
aimed at pursuing a more unified voice in foreign affairs—and informal 
institutions, which are a set of informal constraints deeply rooted in 
cultural norms, standards, and beliefs within society (North 1990, 36-
47). The EU may be very slowly transcending many centuries of 
Westphalian identity in key foreign policy sectors to build toward a 
unified voice based on effective institutions. It may simply take time 
for the ‘informal’ institutions within the EU, such as norms of interstate 
cooperation, to ‘catch up’ with the formal growth in supranational 
foreign policy power in the last twenty years.    
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7.4 States, Foreign Policy, and the EU as a Global Actor 
 
 The possibility that the EU is gradually breaking away from 
centuries of Westphalian identity among member-states presents the 
question of the state itself, and leads to another implication of this 
research. Within the EU, the state continues to be the primary element 
of the Council, but the traditional state does not necessarily dominate 
the other institutions. Instead, the case of the Parliament 
demonstrated how discourse can circumvent the state to shape norms. 
Furthermore it is perhaps flawed to assign stateness to the EU, which 
may be better understood as anything from a neo-medieval empire 
(Zielonka 2006) to a hybrid arrangement. This suggests that it may 
not be necessary, or even desirable, to seek a unified foreign policy, 
and that multiple levels of foreign policy can exist in a complex 
institutional arrangement like the EU. 
 The EU continues to pursue a unified front in foreign policy, and 
many scholars assign at least normative power to the EU in this arena. 
This research focused primarily on areas outside the Common Foreign 
and Security Policy to identify prospects for the EU as a global actor. It 
suggests that the institutions of the EU may not be conducive to 
exerting durable normative power or effective as norm exporter. 
Scholars who are critical of EU activities that appear to impose norms 
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on weaker states can expand their inquiry to ask the extent to which 
EU norms are inextricably linked to credible carrot-and-stick policies, 
and whether such normative power can exist in places lacking 
membership prospects altogether.  
 Although the EU as a whole and its constituent member-states 
can potentially act as unitary actors, this research demonstrated a 
dilemma arises when they attempt to do so at the same time. The 
competing interests meet at the institutional level, and this is precisely 
when gridlock is most likely to occur. The most exemplary instances of 
when member-state interests conflict with EU interests are the 
controversial topics of the Common Foreign and Security Policy, in 
which the EU as a whole must often defer to the state due to the 
intractability of agreement among voting member-states. However, in 
non-CFSP cases like those mostly addressed in this research, the 
competing interests shift away from a member-state versus EU 
dynamic, to a more inter-institutional dynamic, in which the member-
state channels interests through the Council. This means that 
competing institutional interests may be more likely to arise in non-
CFSP matters, and competing state interests more evident in CFSP 
issues. 
 The dynamics discussed in this research may reflect a new kind 
of arrangement with multiple foreign policies, identities, and 
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interests—that of different institutions and constituent member-states. 
This is most evident in policies outside the limited purview of the 
CFSP, such as bilateral, multilateral, humanitarian, and normative 
foreign affairs. The tension between pragmatic and normative policies 
may seem to undermine the EU, but it may actually be characteristic 
of a new supra “state” in the making, one that is not supposed to 
embody the cohesive foreign policy of traditional Westphalian nation-
states. Whether this is a return to a neo-medieval arrangement, as 
some scholars have suggested, or some new conglomerate remains to 
be seen. The latter would be especially innovative, as it would be a 
pseudo-“state” with a single economy, yet multiple foreign policies, 
identities, and interests.  
 
7.5 Additional Avenues for Future Research 
 
 This research presents several possibilities for future research in 
international relations and comparative politics. This study 
demonstrated that foreign policy or discourse thereof is likely based 
more on organizational self-interest than the circumstances of the 
foreign policy issue at hand. This is similar to Graham Allison’s 
argument on bureaucratic politics as a model for institutional foreign-
policy, except that the major role of individual players and 
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personalities within the institution was outside the scope of this study. 
Future research can explore how competing concerns outside foreign 
policy, such as access to resources, may have shaped discourse at the 
institutional level (Allison and Halperin 1972; Hyde-Pierce 2004). 
Some additional avenues of study include unpacking each 
institution to determine patterns of discourse within. Because this 
research adopted the institution as the unit of analysis, questions 
remain of agents within institutions, such as those proposed by 
scholars like Graham Allison, and forums of discourse. Future research 
could look for personalities within institutions—such as the president of 
the Commission; the largest, most economically robust, and most 
political influential states within the Council; and the national origins of 
vocal parliamentarians. These actors may reveal further intricacies 
that underlie or even compel power in institutions. In addition to 
actors within institutions, the forum in which they project discourse 
could also be an avenue of research. It may be possible that a 
particular institution is more or less likely to invoke democratic 
discourse in official speeches rather than bilateral agreements, as one 
forum is more legally binding than the other. 
Using the constructivist lens, additional studies can explore the 
existing discourse further by identifying exogenous shocks to the 
discourse, or how agents within the institutions shaped intersubjective 
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structures through rhetoric and persuasion (Widmaier and Park 2012). 
Democratic norms can be explored to identify how or whether they 
conformed to the “life cycle” of norms proposed by Finnemore and 
Sikkink (1998), in which norm entrepreneurs draw attention to the 
issue (emergence), norms reach a tipping point for diffusion and 
socialization (cascade), and the international community widely 
embraces the norms (internationalization). Researchers can do this by 
selecting normative discourse data, determining which norm 
entrepreneurs were active in the rhetoric, and identifying the 
longitudinal dimension of attitudes regarding the norms in question. 
 Other potential future research topics can expand the time 
period or case studies to include a longer period of institutional 
development or a wider range of political contexts. For example, 
research could compare the EU as an actor in the new member states 
of Central and Eastern Europe with new case studies to determine 
whether the institutional dynamics identified in this research were 
present in cases where the EU enjoyed more effective conditionality. 
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Appendix A: Acronyms 
 
AP  Action Plans 
 
CFSP  Common Foreign and Security Policy 
 
DG  Directorate General 
 
EEAS  External Action Service 
 
EMU  Economic and Monetary Union 
 
ENP  European Neighborhood Policy 
 
EU  European Union 
 
EUMM EU Monitoring Mission (in Georgia) 
 
TEU  Treaty of the European Union 
 
PCA  Partnership and Cooperation Agreement 
 
PCC  Parliamentary Cooperation Committee (of the Parliament) 
 
PSC  Political and Security Committee (of the Council) 
 
SEA  Single European Act of 1986 
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Appendix B: Maps 
 
 
Figure B-1: Map of EU and Neighborhood 
Source: European Commission, 2013   
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Figure B-2: Map of Caucasus and Central Asia 
 Source: University of Texas Libraries, 2003 
